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Cass R. Sunsteint
In this Article, Professor Sunstein describes those aspects of republicanism
that have the strongest claim to contemporary support, outlines the role of
republican thought in the founding period, and explores some of the implica-
tions of republicanism for modern public law. Sunstein claims that the basic
republican commitments involve (1) deliberation in government; (2) political
equality; (3) universality, or agreement as a regulative ideal; and (4) citizen-
ship. Professor Sunstein contends that all of these commitments played an
important role during the founding period, generating a distinctive concep-
tion of governance. In his view, the common opposition between liberalism and
republicanism is a false one; the founders were liberal republicans-a posi-
tion that, Sunstein argues, is superior to its principal competitors. Sunstein
claims that republican ideas suggest reformation of a number of current areas
of modern public law, encompassing such contexts as statutory construction,
campaign finance regulation, federalism, and discrimination. Professor Sun-
stein concludes with a discussion of recent proposals for group or propor-
tional representation, arguing that such proposals can be supported by refer-
ence to the republican belief in deliberative democracy.
For modern republicans, the task is not simply one of excavation. His-
tory does not supply conceptions of political life that can be applied
mechanically to current problems. Circumstances change; theoretical com-
mitments cannot be wrenched out of context without great risk of distor-
tion; contemporary social and legal issues can never be resolved merely
through recovery of features, however important and attractive, of the dis-
tant past. Difficulties of this sort severely complicate modern efforts to
revive principles of classical republicanism.
In addition, much in traditional republican thought gives little cause for
celebration. Various strategies of exclusion-of the nonpropertied, blacks,
and women-were built into the republican tradition. The republican be-
lief in deliberation about the common good was closely tied to these prac-
tices of exclusion; it cannot be neatly separated from them. In some of its
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manifestations, moreover, the republican tradition has been highly mili-
taristic, indeed heroic-exalting, as the model for public life, the fraternity
of soldiers during wartime.' Equally important, the republican belief in
the subordination of private interests to the public good carries a risk of
tyranny and even mysticism. The belief is also threatening to those who
reject the existence of a unitary public good, and who emphasize that con-
ceptions of the good are plural, and dependent on perspective and power.'
In spite of all this, republican theories of politics have a tenacious hold
on political actors and observers, inside and outside of the judiciary. The
characteristically republican belief in deliberative democracy continues to
influence both legal doctrine and contemporary evaluations of the political
process. Political advantages are generally sought through appeals to the
public good, however cynical and transparent such appeals may sometimes
appear.
One of the largest accomplishments of modern historical scholarship has
been the illumination of the role of republican thought in the period
before, during, and after the ratification of the American Constitution.3 It
is no longer possible to see a Lockean consensus 4 in the founding period,
or to treat the framers as modern pluralists believing that self-interest is
the inevitable motivating force behind political behavior.5 Republican
thought played a central role in the framing period, and it offers a power-
ful conception of politics and of the functions of constitutionalism.
Recent work in law has started to explore the place of republican the-
ory in the American constitutional tradition.6 The republican revival is
1. See H. PITKIN, FORTUNE IS A WOMAN: GENDER AND POLITICS IN THE THOUGHT OF Nic-
COLO MACHIAVELLI (1984); J. WITHERSPOON, THE DOMINION OF PROVIDENCE OVER THE PAS-
SIONS OF MEN, A SERMON 34 (1778); P. PAYSON, A SERMON PREACHED BEFORE THE HONOURABLE
COUNCIL . . . OF THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 32 (1778). See generally Bloch, The
Gendered Meanings of Virtue in Revolutionary America, 13 SIGNS 37, 44-47 (1987).
2. This criticism comes from those with quite diverse political views. See, e.g., Young, Impartial-
ity and the Civic Public: Some Implications of Feminist Critiques of Moral and Political Theory, 5
PRAXIS INT'L 381 (1986); Young, Social Movement Challenges to the Idea of Universal Citizenship,
ETHICS (forthcoming 1989) [hereinafter Young, Social Movement Challenges]; S. HOLMES, BENJA-
MIN CONSTANT AND THE MAKING OF MODERN LIBERALISM 148 (1984); K. Sullivan, Against Re-
publicanism (1988) (unpublished manuscript on file with author); Herzog, Some Questions for
Republicans, 14 POL. THEORY 473 (1986).
3. See, e.g., T. PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM (1988); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE
MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (1975); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
1776-1787, at 46-90, 430-67 (1969); Appleby, Republicanism in Old and New Contexts, 43 WM. &
MARY Q. 20 (1986); Appleby, The Social Origins of American Revolutionary Ideology, 64 J. AM.
HisT. 935 (1977-78); Banning, Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited: Liberal and Classical Ideas in The
New American Republic, 43 WM. & MARY Q. 3 (1986); Banning, Republican Ideology and the
Triumph of the Constitution, 1789 to 1793, 31 WM. & MARY Q. 167 (1974); Kramnick, The
"Great National Discussion": The Discourse of Politics in 1787, 45 WM. & MARY Q. 3 (1988);
Shalhope, Republicanism and Early American Historiography, 39 WM. & MARY Q. 334 (1982).
4. At least not if Locke is understood in the familiar fashion. See L. HARTZ, THE LIBERAL
TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955). For a different view, see, for example, J. ASHCRAFT, JOHN LOCKE
AND THE REVOLUTIONARY TRADITION (1986).
5. See R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956).
6. See Michelman, Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); Sherry, Civic Virtue and The Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudica-
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now firmly in place, in legal scholarship if not in legal doctrine. The tasks
for the immediate future are twofold. The first is to spell out, with some
particularity, those aspects of republican thought that have the strongest
claim to contemporary support. The second is to describe institutional ar-
rangements and doctrinal shifts, inside and outside the courts, that might
serve to implement the most attractive features of the republican vision.
This Article has two principal parts. The first is relatively abstract. Its
goal is to outline and defend a particular version of republican thought,
one that avoids some of the difficulties associated with competing concep-
tions of public life, both republican and antirepublican. This version of
republicanism, I argue, is not antiliberal at all;" it incorporates central
features of the liberal tradition. Liberal republicanism is characterized by
commitments to four central principles. These principles are related to
one another; each republican commitment serves to inform and define the
others. All of the principles derive from the republican understanding of
individual and political freedom. All of them provide distinctive ways of
controlling and limiting governmental power.
The first principle is deliberation in politics, made possible by what is
sometimes described as "civic virtue."' In the deliberative process, private
interests are relevant inputs into politics; but they are not taken as pre-
political and exogenous and are instead the object of critical scrutiny.
The second principle is the equality of political actors, embodied in a
desire to eliminate sharp disparities in political participation or influence
among individuals or social groups. Economic equality may, but need not,
accompany political equality; in this sense, as in others, the political pro-
cess has a degree of autonomy from the private sphere.
The third principle is universalism, exemplified by the notion of a com-
mon good, and made possible by "practical reason." The republican com-
mitment to universalism, or agreement as a regulative ideal, takes the
form of a belief in the possibility of settling at least some normative dis-
putes with substantively right answers.
The fourth and final principle is citizenship, manifesting itself in
broadly guaranteed rights of participation. Those rights are designed both
to control representative behavior and to afford an opportunity to exercise
tion, 72 VA. L. REv. 543 (1986); Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L.
REv. 29 (1985); see also Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J.
1013 (1984) (discussing conceptions of "normal" and "constitutional" politics in framing period).
7. Many recent writers have described republicanism as an alternative to liberalism. See, e.g.,
Horwitz, History and Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1825, 1831-35 (1987) (opposing liberalism to
republicanism).
8. Some of those who value civic virtue emphasize the improvement of individual character-as in
the classical formulation-while others understand it as a precondition for the achievement of social
justice. On the second view, civic virtue is necessary for participation in public deliberation, and it is
instrumental to a well-functioning deliberative process. The second view is the principal object here.
See infra text accompanying notes 55-56. For an emphasis on character, see A. Kronman, The Coo-
ley Lectures (unpublished) (on file with The Yale Law Journal).
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and inculcate certain political virtues. Citizenship often occurs in nomi-
nally private spheres, but its primary importance is in governmental
processes.
The second part of this Article is quite concrete. Its goal is to describe
some of the implications of republicanism, thus conceived, for a number of
controversies in modern public law. I suggest that republican understand-
ings call for a reformulation of many current legal rules, inside and
outside the courts. For example, republican themes would affect governing
principles in such contexts as campaign finance regulation, federalism,
statutory construction, and discrimination law. Recent proposals for pro-
portional or group representation raise especially interesting issues here.
While posing serious risks, such proposals raise important issues about
republican theory, and hold out considerable promise. Efforts to ensure
group representation can be closely connected both with institutions in the
original Constitution and with the republican belief in deliberative democ-
racy. In all of these areas, the tasks of spelling out the contemporary ap-
peal of republican thought, and of exploring its implications for tradi-
tional institutional arrangements and legal rights, make it necessary to go
well beyond classical republicanism.
I. CONCEPTIONS OF POLITICS
American public law might be understood as a set of conflicts among
competing conceptions of the nature of American political life. Elements
of these conceptions played a role at the time of the framing; they continue
to influence modern disputes.
A. Pluralism
The first view, which takes both descriptive and normative forms, might
be described as pluralist.9 Under this view, politics consists of a struggle
among interest groups for scarce social resources. Laws are a kind of com-
modity, subject to the forces of supply and demand. Various groups in
society compete for loyalty and support from citizens. Once they are or-
ganized and aligned, they exert pressure on political representatives, who
respond, in a market-like manner, to the pressures thus exerted. The ulti-
mate result is political equilibrium.
9. As used here, the term refers to interest-group theories of politics. For examples, see A. BENr-
LEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT (1908); R. DAHL, supra note 5; D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERN-
MENTAL PROCESS (1951); Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political
Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON.
& MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971). For general discussion, see D. HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 186-220
(1987); Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REV. 873 (1987). I do
not use the word "pluralism" to refer to conceptions of politics and society as involving different
groups pursuing divergent conceptions of the good life. See N. ROSENBLUM, ANOTHER LIBERALISM
155-60 (1987).
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The pluralist approach takes the existing distribution of wealth, ex-
isting background entitlements, and existing preferences as exogenous
variables. All of these form a kind of prepolitical backdrop for pluralist
struggle."0 The goal of the system is to ensure that the various inputs are
reflected accurately in legislation; the system is therefore one of aggregat-
ing citizen preferences. This understanding carries with it a particular
conception of representation, in which officials respond to constituent
desires and exercise little or no independent judgment."1
The appeal of the pluralist understanding-if used normatively-stems
from its utilitarian underpinnings, its effort to respect current preferences,
and its desire to avoid the risks of tyranny that are associated with active
and self-conscious preference-shaping by public officials. The most objec-
tionable exercises of governmental power are often associated with ap-
proaches that see character formation as an end of politics. In these re-
spects, pluralism is committed to familiar conceptions of majority rule12
and to a healthy revulsion to regimes that take citizen preferences as an
object of collective control. But several risks threaten to undermine a plu-
ralist system. In the aggregate, they suggest that pluralism is an altogether
unattractive conception of politics.
1. Bad Preferences and Problems of Unequal Power
The case for pluralism becomes much weaker if some preferences can
be shown to be objectionable or the product of unjust background institu-
tions.13 A significant purpose of politics may be to reveal objectionable
preferences as such through processes of political discussion and debate. 4
10. Existing entitlements are, of course, the product of positive law; in this sense they cannot be
understood as prepolitical. See Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-coercive State,
38 POL. ScI. Q. 470 (1923).
11. See H. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 144-67 (1967) (discussing this view and
its competitors).
12. This understanding seems implicit, for example, in Plott, Axiomatic Social Choice Theory: An
Overview and Interpretation, in RATIONAL MAN AND IRRATIONAL SOCIETY? 229 (B. Barry & R.
Hardin eds. 1982); see also C. OFFE, Legislation Through Majority Rule?, in DISORGANIZED CAPI-
TALISM 259 (1985) (discussing weaknesses in traditional justifications for majority rule and suggesting
reform). A different view is presented in E. SPITZ, MAJORITY RULE 198-216 (1984) (defending
majority rule in part by reference to improvements in social deliberation).
13. An external standard is of course necessary to explain why preferences are objectionable and
to identify unjust background institutions. Usually such judgments depend on a belief that the conse-
quences of certain preferences are to subordinate social groups or that preferences are partly a func-
tion of social institutions that restrict available opportunities. See infra notes 18-20, 49-52.
14. Objectionable preferences may of course play a part in political debate, and they have resulted
in laws based on (for example) racist premises; the republican hope is that deliberative processes will
reduce their incidence. See Goodin, Laundering Preferences, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE
THEORY 75 (J. Elster & A. Hylland eds. 1986). Pluralists, of course, believe in legal constraints on
private behavior, as represented by criminal law and by some aspects of the common law of property,
tort, and contract. To the extent that legal constraints impose limits on force and fraud, they do not
take private preferences as exogenous variables: The target of such laws is character as well as behav-
ior. The point in the text is that pluralism might be objectionable to those who see a function in
"laundering preferences" through discussion quite outside of the context of force and fraud.
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Consider laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race or gender.
Such laws owe their origin, at least in part, to a perception that the pref-
erences that give rise to discrimination are objectionable or distorted by
unjust social institutions. 15 Preferences of that sort may be objectionable
because of their effects in subordinating a social group. They may also
derive from various distortions, including the phenomenon of adaptive
preferences on the part of victims-preferences that are based on the ab-
sence of available opportunities. 6 Preferences may be distorted as well by
interest-induced beliefs on the part of the beneficiaries of existing prac-
tice. 17 A pluralist system is indifferent among preferences, so long as force
and fraud are not involved; because it disregards the sources and effects of
bad preferences, such a system will produce unacceptable results.
The existence of objectionable or distorted preferences suggests that
politics should not simply implement citizen desires, but should also allow
for a measure of critical distance from and scrutiny of those desires, bring-
ing new information and different perspectives to bear." In this sense, the
political sphere should have a degree of autonomy. The difficulties of plu-
ralism in this regard are compounded by the fact that pluralism tends to
ignore the power of some groups to limit the number and nature of issues
set for democratic resolution, 9 or, most generally, the fact that preferences
are formed against the backdrop of disparities in power and limitations in
both opportunities and information."
2. Countering "Deals": Deliberation More Generally
The pluralist understanding increases the likelihood of undesirable law-
making for another reason. Under republican approaches to politics, laws
must be supported by argument and reasons; they cannot simply be fought
for or be the product of self-interested "deals." Private-regarding reasons
are an insufficient basis for legislation. Political actors must justify their
choices by appealing to a broader public good. This requirement has a
15. See, e.g., Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 728, 745-48 (1986) (discussing effects of segregation on preferences).
16. See J. ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES 109-11, 125-40 (1983).
17. This idea is a prominent strand of the social contract tradition. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 136-42 (1971) (using device of original position to eliminate distorting effects of this sort).
For further elaboration of the role of self-interest in political attitudes, see Akerlof & Dickens, The
Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 307 (1982); J. ELSTER, MAK-
ING SENSE OF MARX 459-61 (1985); R. GEUSS, THE IDEA OF A CRITICAL THEORY 12-22 (1981).
18. This idea is associated with a Kantian idea of individual autonomy and an analogous concep-
tion of political freedom. As individual freedom is seen in private self-determination, political freedom
is seen as the collective choice of ends. For discussion, see H. PrrKIN, supra note 1, at 7, 240, 281-82,
315-16, 324-25; T. NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 113-20, 130-37, 166-71 (1986). On the
differences between politics and markets, see, for example, Manin, On Legitimacy and Political De-
liberation, 15 PoL THEORY 338 (1987); Elster, The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of
Political Theory, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY, supra note 14, at 103.
19. See Bachrach & Baratz, The Two Faces of Power, 56 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 947 (1962).
20. See S. LUKES, POWER (1974); J. ELSTER, supra note 16, at 125-40.
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disciplining effect on the sorts of measures that can be proposed and en-
acted. The requirement of appeal to public-regarding reasons may make it
more likely that public-regarding legislation will actually be enacted.2"
The central idea here is that politics has a deliberative or transforma-
tive dimension. Its function is to select values, to implement "preferences
about preferences,'1 22 or to provide opportunities for preference formation
rather than simply to implement existing desires.23 The point is a quite
general one, extending beyond discrimination law to environmental mea-
sures, regulation of broadcasting, welfare expenditures, and many other
areas. Under the pluralist understanding, there is reason for skepticism
about such laws; they might appear to be impermissible "rent-seeking," or
illegitimate wealth transfers.2 Indeed, on pluralist assumptions it is un-
clear why laws should not be bought and sold like commodities in a mar-
ketplace; such a process of sale might accurately aggregate preferences.
But for those who believe in a deliberative function for politics, the mar-
ketplace metaphor will be misguided, and laws of these sorts must be un-
derstood in nonpluralist terms.
3. Utilitarian Malfunctions
Much of the appeal of pluralism stems from its connection with utilita-
rianism. 25 But even if one believes that an entirely utilitarian approach to
politics is desirable, it is by no means clear that ordinary majoritarianism,
understood in pluralist terms, should be accepted.
First, accurate aggregation of preferences through politics is unlikely to
be accomplished in light of the conundrums in developing a social welfare
function.26 Public choice theory has shown that cycling problems, strategic
and manipulative behavior, sheer chance, and other factors prevent major-
itarianism from providing an accurate aggregation of preferences. 27 Sec-
21. Tocqueville so suggested. See A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, in JOHN STUART
MILL ON POLITICS AND SOCIETY 186, 222-23 (G. Williams ed. 1976); see also W. NELSON, ON
JUSTIFYING DEMOCRACY 94-130 (1980) (emphasizing public deliberation as a value of democracy);
J. ELSTER, supra note 16, at 35-42 (critically discussing this view).
It would of course be a mistake to exaggerate the extent of this effect. Self-interested motivations
may merely be concealed; the requirement of deliberation can be an invitation to hypocrisy and deceit.
22. See Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1140
(1986).
23. Cf Stewart, Regulation in a Liberal State: The Role of Non-Commodity Values, 92 YALE
L.J. 1537 (1983) (discussing noncommodity values in regulation and criticizing efforts to understand
statutes as "deals"); Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing, 74 VA. L. REV. 199, 224-35 (1988) (arguing
that political choices involved in regulation must be evaluated according to criteria other than "rent-
seeking").
24. A framework of this sort underlies some of the normative aspects of the economic approach to
regulation. Almost every issue of the Journal of Law and Economics has at least one contribution
confirming this point.
25. See Becker, supra note 9.
26. See K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963); W. RIKER, LIBER-
ALISM vs. POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BErWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THE-
ORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE (1982).
27. See W. RIKER, supra note 26.
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ond, majority rule is indifferent to variations in intensity of preferences,2"
and it is fanciful to think that the various supplements to majoritarianism
in a pluralist democracy-different levels of participation and financial
contribution, for example-will take up the slack.
Even if these problems might be surmounted, one would have to be
optimistic indeed to believe that there is an identity between the result
that would be reached by the considered utilitarian and that which would
be reached by a legislature responding to constituent pressures as they are
generally imposed. In any representative democracy, there is simply too
much slippage between legislative outcomes and constituent desires. 9
These various considerations converge on a single conclusion: Although
pluralist approaches are often defended as a means of ascertaining the
"public will," that concept is an incoherent one within pluralist theory.30
Sometimes republicans and others invoke considerations of this sort in
order to support constitutional protections against the operation of the
public sphere. In particular, some observers, often drawing on public
choice theory and purporting to follow Locke, argue in favor of rigid
property rights and severe restrictions on collective interference with the
existing distribution of wealth and entitlements."' But this strategy disre-
gards the other failings of pluralism. As we will see, it also depends on an
undefended belief in a prepolitical or exogenous private sphere, greatly
overstates the real-world failings of deliberative government, and ignores
the ways in which existing distributions and preferences are a product of
law.3 2
4. Absence of Participation
Pluralist approaches place no premium on political participation. In-
deed, for pluralists the absence of political participation is an affirmative
good, suggesting general contentment with the status quo and proximity to
the equilibrium point.3 Pluralists will therefore be unwilling to take steps
28. This is a standard economic objection. For recent discussion, see J. Elster, Nuts and Bolts
(1987) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
29. This is the foundation of the economic critique of interest-group politics. See, e.g., R. HAR-
DIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982); M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
30. See Riker & Weingast, Constitutional Regulation of Legislative Choice: The Political Conse-
quences of Judicial Deference to Legislatures, 74 VA. L. REV. 373, 381-88 (1988). One should not,
however, overstate this conclusion by denying that there is a connection between democratic outcomes
and the public will, or by suggesting that nondemocratic institutions would be as accurate as demo-
cratic ones in capturing public desires. Historical evidence suggests precisely the contrary, as do recent
developments in public choice theory. See Farber & Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74
VA. L. REV. 423, 429-37 (1988); Sen, Social Choice and Justice: A Review Article, 23 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 1764, 1770-74 (1985).
31. See J. BUCHANAN & G. TuLLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); R. EPSTEIN, TAK-
INGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
32. See infra notes 49-62 & 221-25.
33. See, e.g., L. MILBRATH, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: How AND WHY Do PEOPLE GET IN-
VOLVED IN POLITICS? (1965); B. BERELSON, P. LAZARSFELD, & W. McPHEE, VOTING: A STUDY OF
OPINION FORMATION IN A PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN (1954).
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to promote political activity. But the absence of participation may reflect
instead a collective action problem"' or an adaptation to practices that are
believed intractable;35 and in any case, a system lacking widespread par-
ticipation will suffer from the failure to cultivate the various qualities that
may accompany political life-self-development, feelings of empathy, so-
cial solidarity, and so forth.36 One need not believe that the political life is
uniquely valuable, or that a system lacking widespread and frequent citi-
zen participation is necessarily oppressive '3 in order to conclude that po-
litical activity is often an important individual and collective good.
There is considerable doubt about the descriptive power of pluralist un-
derstandings for contemporary political life; 8 but it would be hard to
deny that elements of pluralism provide a central feature of modern polit-
ics. And in light of the multiple failings of pluralism, critics have often
pointed to republican conceptions of politics as possible alternatives. Such
conceptions appear, at every turn, to oppose pluralist approaches. Aspects
of classical republicanism found an American home in the work of the
antifederalists; and antifederalist thought has exerted a continuing influ-
ence on American public law. But elements of republican thought can be
found in the views of the federalists as well.
B. The Republican Alternative
Republican conceptions of politics diverge substantially from one an-
other; there is no unitary approach that can be described as republican. 9
Classical republicans emphasized the role of the polis as the locus for
achieving freedom through active citizenship. On this view, political par-
ticipants were to subordinate their private interests to the public good
through political participation in an ongoing process of collective self-
34. See R. HARDIN, supra note 29.
35. See J. GAVENTA, POWER AND POWERLESSNESS (1980); J. EISTER, supra note 16, at 125-33;
Boudon, The Logic of Relative Frustration, in RATIONALITY AND REVOLUTION 245 (M. Taylor ed.
1988).
36. See C. PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRACTIC THEORY (1970); cf. J. EISTER, supra
note 16 (showing that such effects are "essentially by-products").
37. Some republican approaches are premised on the idea, traceable to Aristotle, that political life
is the best life for human beings (or at least for certain classes of them). See, e.g., H. ARENDT, ON
REVOLUTION 215-82 (1963); Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1980).
This view also appears to underlie M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982).
But modern republicanism respects other conceptions of the good life as well.
38. Compare M. DERTHIcK & P. QUIRK, THE PoLrrIcs OF DEREGULATION 8-27, 237-58
(1985) (arguing that congressional behavior cannot be explained by reference to interest-group pres-
sures) and S. KELMAN, MAKING PUBLIC POLICY 44-66 (1987) (same) and A. MAASS, CONGRESS
AND THE COMMON GOOD (1983) (same) with Becker, supra note 9 (discussing interest-group power
over legislative outcomes) and Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. &
ECON. 211 (1976) (same).
39. For general discussion, see Pangle, Civic Virtue: The Founders' Conception and the Tradi-
tional Conception, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS (G. Bryner & N. Reynolds eds. 1987);
J.G.A. POCOCK, supra note 3; Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism
and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse, 74 J. AM. HisT. 9 (1987).
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determination.40 Civic virtue was thus a central organizing principle of
classical politics.
Many of those in the framing period defined republicanism much more
generally, opposing it to monarchy, aristocracy, and despotism. Madison,
for example, defined a republic as "a government which derives all its
powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people; and is
administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a lim-
ited period, or during good behavior." '
Despite the differences among various forms of republicanism, republi-
can theories tend to be united by four central commitments, and in any
event it is in these commitments that the contemporary appeal of republi-
can thought can be located. The elaboration of those commitments will be
necessarily abstract. It would be possible to describe versions of republi-
canism that are quite concrete but far less attractive to modern observ-
ers;42 and as we will see, the republican commitments, as characterized
here, have important implications for a number of controversies in modern
public law. All of these commitments are united by the republican concep-
tion of individual autonomy as involving selection rather than implemen-
tation of ends, and the republican conception of political freedom, which
prizes collective self-determination.43
1. Deliberation
Many republican conceptions treat politics as above all deliberative; 4
and deliberation is to cover ends as well as means. Although elements of
this idea can be found in Aristotle and, even more, in Harrington, the
belief in political deliberation is a distinctly American contribution to re-
publican thought."5 The function of politics, on this view, is not simply to
implement existing private preferences. Political actors are not supposed
to come to the process with preselected interests that operate as exogenous
variables. The purpose of politics is not to aggregate private preferences,
or to achieve an equilibrium among contending social forces. The republi-
can belief in deliberation counsels political actors to achieve a measure of
40. See H. ARENDT, supra note 37, at 248-55; D. HELD, supra note 9.
41. Madison continued: "It is essential to such a government that it be derived from the great
body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it .... It is sufficient
for such a government that the persons administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by
the people ...." THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 241 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (emphasis in
original).
42. See infra notes 136-46 and accompanying text (describing various forms of republican
thought).
43. See infra text accompanying notes 95-100. On some of the conundrums here, see T. NAGEL,
supra note 18, at 113-20, 130-34, 166-71.
44. J.G.A. POCOCK, supra note 3, at 287-90; H. PITmIN, supra note 11, at 300-04; see infra text
accompanying notes 104-18 (discussing Madison and anti-federalists).
45. By contrast, Rousseau, an important inspiration for many republicans, did not believe in de-
liberation among the citizenry. See J. RoUssAU, The Social Contract, in JEAN JAcQuES RouSSEAu:
POLITICAL WRITINGs 29-30 (F. Watkins trans. 1986).
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critical distance from prevailing desires and practices, subjecting these
desires and practices to scrutiny and review.4"
To say this is not to suggest that deliberation calls for some standard
entirely external to private beliefs and values (as if such a thing could be
imagined).47 The republican position is instead that existing desires
should be revisable in light of collective discussion and debate, bringing to
bear alternative perspectives and additional information. Thus, for exam-
ple, republicans will attempt to design political institutions that promote
discussion and debate among the citizenry; they will be hostile to systems
that promote lawmaking as "deals" or bargains among self-interested pri-
vate groups; they may well attempt to insulate political actors from pri-
vate pressure; and they may also favor judicial review designed to promote
political deliberation and perhaps to invalidate laws when deliberation has
not occurred.4
8
A central point here is that individual preferences should not be taken
as exogenous to politics.' 9 They are a function of existing practice, includ-
ing legal rules; such rules cannot, without circularity, be justified by refer-
ence to current preferences. As we have seen, private preferences may be a
product of adaptation by the disadvantaged" and interest-induced beliefs
on the part of the relatively well-off. 1 Republicans are thus unlikely to
take existing preferences and entitlements as fixed. Both are permissible
objects of political deliberation. In the republican view, for example, the
distribution of wealth is a matter for political disposition; there is no hos-
tility to redistributive measures. Republicans believe that if used as a term
of opprobrium, the notion of "rent-seeking" is badly misdirected.
The republican belief in deliberation is aspirational and critical rather
than celebratory and descriptive. It is a basis for evaluating political prac-
tices. Modern republicans do not claim that existing systems actually em-
body republican deliberation. The republican commitments may reveal
that actual deliberation, and purportedly deliberative processes, are badly
distorted. On the republican view, moreover, the requirement of delibera-
46. Here there is a connection between republicanism and conceptions of politics associated with
Kant. See I. KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 114 (H. Paton trans. 1984).
47. See M. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND ETHICS IN GREEK TRAGEDY
AND PHILOSOPHY (1986) (contrasting Platonic belief in foundations with Aristotelian practical rea-
son); H. PUTNAM, THE MANY FACES OF REALISM (1987) (arguing against foundationalism); M.
WALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM (1987) (discussing interpretation as mode of so-
cial evaluation).
48. See infra text accompanying notes 216-20 & 229-48 (describing statutory construction and
constitutional controls); Sunstein, supra note 6, at 49-79.
49. See Manin, On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation, 15 POL THEORY 338 (1987); H. PIT-
KIN, supra note 11, at 93-97; J. Rawls, The Priority of the Right (unpublished manuscript on file
with author); Beer, The Strengths of Liberal Democracy, in A PROSPECT OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
(W. Livingston ed. 1979). On government by discussion and the liberal tradition, see infra note 155.
50. See J. ELSTER, supra note 16, at 105-11,121-31; see also K. BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS
SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VICTIMS 26-30 (1987) (discussing mechanisms by which
victims of discrimination decide not to complain or to drop complaints once initiated).
51. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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tion is not purely formal. The antonym of deliberation is the imposition of
outcomes by self-interested and politically powerful private groups; repub-
licans emphasize that deliberative processes are often undermined by in-
timidation, strategic and manipulative behavior, collective action problems,
adaptive preferences, or-most generally-disparities in political influ-
ence. The requirement of deliberation is designed to ensure that political
outcomes will be supported by reference to a consensus (or at least broad
agreement) among political equals.
Thus understood, the requirement disciplines political outcomes," car-
rying with it constraints that exclude some results and compel others. The
requirement of deliberation embodies substantive limitations that in some
settings lead to uniquely correct outcomes.53 Modern examples include the
protection of freedom of speech and the prohibition of discrimination
against blacks and women.' In this respect, the republican commitment
to deliberation is closely allied with the republican beliefs in equality and
universalism, taken up below. The commitment to deliberation is particu-
larly controversial to those who believe either that its role is inevitably
minimal in modern politics or that even as an aspiration, deliberation,
standing by itself, is of little assistance in generating desirable outcomes.
The emphasis on deliberation in republican thought is closely allied
with the republican beliefs that the motivating force of political behavior
should not be self-interest, narrowly defined, and that civic virtue should
play a role in political life. There is no mystery to this claim; it refers
simply to the understanding that in their capacity as political actors, citi-
zens and representatives are not supposed to ask only what is in their
private interest, but also what will best serve the community in gen-
eral 5'-understood as a response to the best general theory of social wel-
fare. Thus understood, the requirement accommodates a wide range of
possible positions; but it is a constraint nonetheless. Sometimes the appeal
to civic virtue is designed to improve individual character-a particularly
important theme in classical republican thought. But modern republicans
52. See Pitkin, Justice: On Relating Public to Private, 9 POL. THEORY 327, 346-47 (1981).
53. Whether and to what extent these outcomes are culturally specific is beyond the scope of this
discussion. See, e.g., M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUITY
(1982); Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1987). The
republican conception of political truth is, moreover, better thought of as pragmatic than foundational-
ist. See infra text accompanying notes 79-81.
54. The idea here is that in its meaning in ordinary language, the term "deliberation" includes
constraints on inputs and outcomes; as a consequence, certain results could not be the product of a
genuine deliberative process.
It is important to note as well that antidiscrimination measures are a product of a wide range of
social developments, not of deliberation alone. Exercises of social power on the part of the disadvan-
taged, changing economic conditions, technical advances, and other factors play an important role. (It
is ironic in this regard that the prohibition of sex discrimination was added by the opponents of title
VII and was adopted without deliberation.)
55. See, e.g., J.G.A. POCOCK, supra note 3, at 209 (noting that political actors should look "to the
public good"); see also J. RAWLS, supra note 17, at 361 ("Each rational legislator is to vote his
opinion as to which laws and policies best conform to principles of justice.").
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invoke civic virtue primarily in order to promote deliberation in the ser-
vice of social justice, not to elevate the character of the citizenry.
Republican approaches are often said to be antagonistic to private
rights56-an understanding traceable to the fact that republicans see the
private sphere as the product of public decisions, and deny the existence of
natural or prepolitical entitlements. Republican theories are not, however,
hostile to the protection of individual or group autonomy from state con-
trol. Indeed, legal rights have quite consistently accompanied republican
systems.57 What is distinctive about the republican view is that it under-
stands most rights as either the preconditions for or the outcome of an
undistorted deliberative process.58 Thus, for example, the principle of de-
liberation argues in favor of liberty of expression and conscience and the
right to vote; these are the basic preconditions for republican deliberation.
Liberal systems could be, and have in fact been, founded on premises of
this sort;59 but understandings that point to prepolitical or natural rights"0
are entirely foreign to republicanism. On the republican point of view, the
existence of realms of private autonomy must be justified in public terms.
The difference is illustrated by different approaches to private property.
Republicans have historically believed in the importance of property
rights as a shield against the state and as a guarantor of security, indepen-
dence, and virtue.6" Modern-day republicans might well share that view;
but because of the republican emphasis on the social construction of prop-
erty rights, republicans are hardly hostile to redistribution or to collective
efforts to reassess the existing distribution of wealth and entitlements.6
Indeed, because of the republican emphasis on the social conditions for
republican deliberation, republican commitments point powerfully in the
direction of equalizing political influence-a point to which I now turn.
56. See, e.g., Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, 12 POL. THEORY 81
(1984).
57. It is noteworthy here that it was the antifederalists, closely associated with republican thought,
who were most strongly in favor of a bill of rights during the framing period.
58. Notions of this general sort are at work in J. RAWLS, supra note 17, and J. HABERMAS, THE
PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY 294-326 (1987). See also D. HELD, supra note 9, at
182, 298-99 (discussing "ideal normative agreement").
59. See J. RAWLS, supra note 17, at 205-21 (discussing liberty of conscience); B. ACKERMAN,
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 4-10, 357-59 (1980). Both of these efforts have much in
common with republican understandings as set out here. See also J. HABERMAS, supra note 58, at
294-326 (suggesting nondistorted communicative action as regulative ideal for politics).
60. For modem examples, see R. EPSTEIN, supra note 31, at 3-18; R. NOzIcK, ANARCHY,
STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
61. See J.G.A. POCOCK, supra note 3, at 386-87, 390 (discussing Harrington); Pocock, Oceana;
Its Argument and Character, in THE POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES HARRINGTON 43, 68 [hereinaf-
ter Pocock, Argument and Character] (J.G.A. Pocock ed. 1977); Pocock, The History of the Ideology:
Harrington's Ideas After His Lifetime, in id. at 150-51 [hereinafter Pocock, Harrington's Ideas]
(discussing Jefferson).
62. See Dahl, On Removing Certain Impediments to Democracy in the United States, in THE
MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (R. Horwitz ed. 1985).
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2. Political Equality
Many republican writers have placed a high premium on political
equality. Political equality, in republican terms, is understood as a re-
quirement that all individuals and groups have access to the political pro-
cess; large disparities in political influence are disfavored. 3 Republicans
are likely to be highly receptive, for example, to measures designed to
reduce the effects of wealth in the political process64 or to furnish access to
the media.6" On at least some versions of the pluralist conception of poli-
tics, such measures point in exactly the wrong directions. Government is
inevitably the enemy of freedom of expression; the distribution of private
power is off limits to politics.66 By contrast, many republican writers em-
phasized the close connection between republican systems and economic
equality. Dramatic differences in wealth and power are, in this view, in-
consistent with the underlying premises of a republican polity. Montes-
quieu was particularly insistent on this point, envisioning equality as a
necessary precondition for republicanism. 7 Even for republicans who ac-
cept a large degree of economic inequality, sharp disparities in political
influence are a severe source of concern.68
63. For Madison's view, see supra note 41; infra note 75. On this score, there is a connection
between the republican belief in political equality and some pluralist efforts to promote access to the
political process, see, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT (1980), but the pluralist view places
little premium on deliberation or citizenship.
Of course the republican aspiration to political equality was violated by important features of re-
publican practice. The relationship between the republican belief in political equality and republican
social hierarchies was quite complex; republicans saw political equality in surprising places. See
J.G.A. POCOCK, supra note 3, at 467-70; H. PITKIN, supra note 11, at 23-90.
64. See infra notes 204-07.
65. See infra note 206.
66. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); 52 Fed. Reg. 31,768 (1987) (decision by FCC to repeal
fairness doctrine). It is important to note in this connection that some pluralists, growing out of the
utilitarian tradition, seek to minimize side-constraints on government in order not to interfere with
political struggle. See, e.g., Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court
and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 5 (1984). Other commentators, believing in pluralism as
an accurate description of politics, fearful of "rent-seeking," and purporting to be associated with
Locke, attempt to create rigid, property-based barriers to government action. See R. EPSTEIN, supra
note 31. Both of these views are at odds with republicanism.
67.
Love of the republic in a democracy, is a love of the democracy; love of the democracy is that
of equality. Love of the democracy is likewise that of frugality. As every individual ought to
have here the same happiness and the same advantages, they ought consequently to taste the
same pleasures and to form the same hopes; which cannot be expected but from a general
frugality. The love of equality in a democracy limits ambition to the sole desire, to the sole
happiness of doing greater services to our country than the rest of our fellow citizens .... A
true maxim it is therefore, that in order to love equality and frugality in a republic, these
virtues must have been previously established by law.
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS bk. V, chs. iii-iv (D. Carrithers ed. 1977).
68. See infra note 75 (discussing Madison); see also H. PrrKIN, supra note 1, at 88-90; J.G.A.
POCOCK, supra note 3, at 258 (discussing political equality amid economic disparities), 467-70, 537
(distinguishing equality of position from republican idea of political equality); Pocock, Oceana: Its
Ideological Context, in THE POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES HARRINGTON 15, 18 [hereinafter Pocock,
Ideological Context] (J.G.A. Pocock ed. 1977) (describing republican inequality as "relations of de-
pendence among citizens who should be equally subject to none but the public power"); cf. S. VERBA
& G. ORREN, EQUALITY IN AMERICA: THE VIEW FROM THE ToP 7-20 (1985) (discussing American
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Some of the American antifederalists emphasized the threats of com-
mercialism and argued in favor of material equality. Thus Centinel wrote
that a "republican, or free government, can only exist where the body of
the people are virtuous, and where property is pretty equally divided; in
such a government the people are the sovereign and their sense or opinion
is the criterion of every public measure; for when this ceases to be the
case, the nature of the government is changed, and an aristocracy, monar-
chy or despotism will rise on its ruin." 9 Thus Cato wrote that "Domin-
ion follows Property . . . An Equality of Estate will give an Equality of
Power; and an Equality of Power is a Commonwealth, or Democracy,"
and feared that "Very great Riches in private Men . . . destroy . . . that
Balance of Property and Power, which is necessary to a Democracy. 1 7
0
Captain Welton claimed that for a popular or democratic system "an
equal distribution of property was necessary. 11  It should not be surpris-
ing that a disproportionate number of those in favor of paper money and
debtor relief legislation fell within the antifederalist camp. 2
The republican belief in political equality is itself highly controversial,
as the debate over campaign finance regulation reveals.73 The notion that
political equality depends on economic equality is even more so, and has
hardly been shared by all republican theorists."4 But many of the Ameri-
can framers, including Madison, expressed concern about both political
and economic inequality. 5
commitment to political equality but ambivalence about economic equality); S. VERBA, ELITES AND
THE IDEA OF EQUALITY 264-65 (1987) (noting that many people not committed to economic equality
believe in political equality).
69. THE ANTI-FEDERALIST 16 (H. Storing ed., M. Dry abr. 1985).
70. CATO'S LETTERS 113, 161, 207.
71. Middlesex Gazette (Middletown, Conn.), June 18, 1787.
72. See J.T. MAIN, THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS: CRrrIcs OF THE CONSTITUTION 1781-1788, at
162-67, 261-70 (1981).
73. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
74. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison) (including equal distribution of wealth as "an
improper and vicious project"). Burke of course believed in political deliberation but not in equality;
for a modern illustration of a similar view, see A. Kronman, supra note 8. On some of the risks in
such approaches, see infra text accompanying notes 249-65 (discussing value of proportional
representation).
75. Consider these excerpts from Madison's list of the means of combating the "evil of parties":
1. By establishing a political equality among all. 2. By withholding unnecessary opportunities
from a few, to increase the inequality of property, by an immoderate, and especially an unmer-
ited, accumulation of riches. 3. By the silent operation of laws, which, without viblating the
rights of property, reduce extreme wealth towards a state of mediocrity, and raise extreme
indigence towards a state of comfort.
14 J. MADISON, THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 197-98 (R.A. Rutland ed. 1983) (emphasis in
original).
See also Jefferson's suggestion:
I am conscious that an equal division of property is impracticable. But the consequences of this
enormous inequality producing so much misery to the bulk of mankind, legislatures cannot
invent too many devices for subdividing property, only taking care to let their subdivisions go
hand in hand with the natural affections of the human mind .... Another means of silently
lessening the inequality of property is to exempt all from taxation below a certain point, and to
tax the higher portions of property in geometrical progression as they rise. Whenever there is
[sic) in any country, uncultivated lands and unemployed poor, it is clear that the laws of
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3. Universalism: Agreement as a Regulative Ideal
Republican thought is characterized by a belief in universalism, a term
that I will use in a somewhat idiosyncratic sense. The republican commit-
ment to universalism amounts to a belief in the possibility of mediating
different approaches to politics, or different conceptions of the public
good, through discussion and dialogue. 6 The process of mediation is
designed to produce substantively correct outcomes, understood as such
through the ultimate criterion of agreement among political equals. It is
because of the belief in universalism that republican approaches posit the
existence of a common good, to be found at the conclusion of a well-func-
tioning deliberative process." Republicans thus reject ethical relativism
and skepticism, and believe that different perspectives are sometimes sub-
ject to mediation both in theory and in the real world. The institutional
consequence is that republicans will be hostile to bargaining mechanisms
in the political process 8 and will instead seek to ensure agreement among
political participants. The republican belief in agreement as a regulative
ideal, and the republican conception of political truth, are pragmatic in
character. They do not depend on a belief in ultimate foundations for
political outcomes.7 9
Under pluralist assumptions, the notion of a common good is alterna-
tively mystical or tyrannical.8" Republican theories, on the other hand,
property have been so far extended as to violate natural right. The earth is given as a common
stock for man to labor and live on.
8 T. JEFFERSON, THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 681-82 (J. Boyd ed. 1953).
See also T. PAINE, Dissertation on the First Principles of Government, in 5 LIFE OF THOMAS
PAINE 221 (1795) ("The true and only true basis of representative government is equality of rights.");
4 J. ELLIOTT, DEBATES OF THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FED-
ERAL CONSTITUTION 320-23 (1888) ("mediocrity of fortune is a leading feature in our national
character . . . we may with safety assert that the great body of national wealth is nearly equally in
the hands of the people, among whom there are few dangerously rich or few miserably poor; that we
may congratulate ourselves with living under the blessings of a mild and equal government, which
knows no distinctions but those of merits or talents-under a government whose honors and duties are
equally open to the exertions of all her citizens") (remarks of Pinckney).
76. See J.G.A. POCOCK, supra note 3, at 255 (discussing republican "function of universalizing
decision, of ensuring that it was free from corrupting particular interests. The role of the many was
less to assert the will of the non-elite than to maximize the impersonality of government."); see also
infra notes 108-17 (discussing Madison).
77. See J.G.A. POCOCK, supra note 3, at 132-36; H. PITKIN, supra note 11, at 85-87. Of course
this process occurs within cultural limits.
78. See, for example, the critical discussion of regulatory negotiation in Funk, When Smoke Gets
in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and the Public Interest-EPA's Woodstove Standards, 18
ENVTL. L. 55 (1987).
79. For the pragmatic view, see J. DEWEY, THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY 259, 265, 272-73(1929) (claiming that there is a need for critical reflection on the "conditions under which objects are
enjoyed" and "the consequences of esteeming and liking them" and arguing that 'judgments about
values are judgments about that which should regulate the formation of our desires, affections and
enjoyments" (emphasis in original)); H. PUTNAM, supra note 47; C. PEIRCE, Pragmaticism in Retro-
spect: A Last Formulation, in PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF PEIRCE (J. Buhler ed. 1955);
Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988).
80. See J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (1976).
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rely on the deliberative functions of politics and on practical reason," x and
embrace the notion of the common good as a coherent one. To some de-
gree this belief depends on a commitment to political empathy, 2 embodied
in a requirement that political actors attempt to assume the position of
those who disagree. Political outcomes are, on this view, not limited to the
achievement of Pareto improvements or to the supply of collective goods.
Measures that attempt to select and pronounce values-embodied in, for
example, broadcasting regulation, environmental measures, or antidis-
crimination law-attest to the republican belief in universalism. Such
measures represent the outcome of a deliberative process among political
equals; they do not take existing preferences and practices as exogenous.
To say this is not to suggest that republicans believe in a unitary public
good, or that they deny that differently situated individuals and groups
will frequently be unable to resolve their disagreements through conversa-
tion.8 3 Sometimes compromises are necessary;"" sometimes there will be
political losers; some issues-religion is a familiar example-should be
entirely off-limits to politics.83 It would be fanciful to suggest that differ-
ent conceptions of the good life can or should always be mediated through
politics. The republican position is not that every issue is subject to politi-
cal resolution; it is instead that some questions can yield general agree-
ment through deliberation. A conception of politics that disregards this
fact will be doomed to repeat the failings of pluralism.
4. Citizenship
Republican approaches place a high premium on citizenship and par-
ticipation,88 and thus seek mechanisms both for citizen control of national
81. See Michelman, supra note 6, at 24-36.
82. See Okin, Reason and Feeling in Thinking about Justice, in ETHICS (forthcoming 1989); see
also J. RAWLS, supra note 17, at 358 ("In everyday life the exchange of opinion with others checks
our partiality and widens our perspective; we are made to see things from their standpoint and the
limits of our vision are brought home to us.").
83. [U]niversalism . . . plays a part [in politics], but it is not assumed at the start. It seems to
be the ideal term of the process. In truth, no party will ever become an actually universal
party; there will always remain opponents; this is the core of political pluralism. Nevertheless
the structure of the deliberative system usually makes the protagonists strive to enlarge their
points of view and propose more and more general positions. There is a sort of competition for
generality.
Manin, On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation, 15 PoL THEORY 338, 358-59 (1987); see also S.
WHITE, THE RECENT WORK OF JtURGEN HABERMAS 75-77 (1988) (discussing role of compromise);
E. SprTz, MAJORITY RULE 211-16 (1984) (discussing compromise, deliberation, and majority rule).
84. See S. WHITE, supra note 83, at 75-77.
85. This exclusion of religion from politics has been based both on the notion that religious con-
viction is a matter of private right and on the view that removal of religion from the political agenda
protects republican politics by ensuring against stalemate and factionalism. In this somewhat ironic
latter sense, rights are preconditions for republican deliberation. See Holmes, Gag Rules and Democ-
racy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (J. Elster ed. 1988).
86. See Pocock, Harrington's Ideas, supra note 61, at 4, 142-44, 393-94 (describing Harring-
ton's effort to construct "a scheme of participation for all citizens, based on the frequent assemblies of
local communities").
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institutions and for decentralization, local control, and local self-determi-
nation. A large purpose of participation is to monitor the behavior of rep-
resentatives in order to limit the risks of factionalism and self-interested
representation. But on the republican view, political participation is not
only instrumental in the ordinary sense; it is also a vehicle for the inculca-
tion of such characteristics as empathy, virtue, and feelings of commu-
nity8' 7 (and this is so even if the motivation for participation is instrumen-
tal"'). The belief in citizenship is part of the republican antipathy to
certain versions of political individualism. It repudiates approaches that
place no premium on political participation as an independent good;
republicans therefore attempt to provide outlets for the exercise of
citizenship.
According to the antifederalists, for example, representation was at best
a necessary evil, and its risks were to be limited by ensuring that public
officials would be tightly controlled by the citizenry. It was for this reason
that in evaluating the institutions of the proposed Constitution, the anti-
federalists were least suspicious of the House of Representatives and re-
garded the President and the judiciary with most alarm; the Senate was
an intermediate case.8"
Allied with this idea is the familiar belief that republican systems
should be small and decentralized. A large republic threatens to diminish
the connection between rulers and ruled and decrease opportunities for
participation. "[T]he civic humanist ideal had originated in a re-assertion
of the vita activa, and it was the ultimate goal of the citizen to assert his
virtue in action, of which the republic was the frame."9 A large republic
would thus tend to produce corruption, the greatest obstacle to a well-
functioning republican system. Moreover, and equally important, the re-
publican belief in deliberation about the common good is most easily sus-
tained when there is homogeneity and agreement about foundations.
Where such agreement is entirely absent, deliberative processes may break
down."1 A belief in decentralization and a fear of the diversity of a large
republic naturally accompany this concern. This point raises important
difficulties for efforts to revive republican thought in a large and heteroge-
neous nation.
At the same time, traditional republican thought was hostile to com-
87. See supra note 36.
88. See J. ELSTER, supra note 16, at 91-100, which shows that these effects cannot plausibly be
the motivating force for political participation; they must instead be "essentially by-products" of activ-
ity engaged in for instrumental purposes.
89. See J.T. MAIN, supra note 72, at 135-42.
90. See Pocock, Ideological Context, supra note 68, at 18.
91. The antifederalist Brutus emphasized this point: "In a republic, the manners, sentiments, and
interests of the people should be similar. If this be not the case, there will be a constant clashing of
opinions; and the representatives of one part will be continually striving against those of the other." 2
THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST 369 (H. Storing ed. 1980). But see infra text accompanying notes
126-27, 201-02 (discussing importance of disagreement to republican deliberation).
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merce and luxury.92 Commercial development tends, in this view, to pro-
duce avarice and to weaken the attachment to the public good on which
republican systems depend. Other forms of republicanism approach com-
merce quite differently, regarding it as a means of achieving cordial rela-
tions among potential adversaries and thus of softening social tensions.9"
The four basic republican principles are closely related to one another.
For example, the commitment to political equality is allied with the belief
in deliberation. The norm of equality constrains both inputs and outputs
of the deliberative process; particular groups may not be excluded from
the process, and results that subordinate politically weak groups are pro-
scribed.94 The belief in universalism and agreement as a regulative ideal is
a natural consequence of the republican faith in deliberation and political
equality. Citizenship is a predicate for political deliberation, and the norm
of political equality has consequences for the desirable forms of citizen-
ship. The various republican commitments thus help to qualify and in-
form each other.
The commitments are in turn traceable to the republican conception of
individual and political freedom. On this view, individual freedom consists
not in the implementation but instead in the selection of ends.95 Such a
process emphasizes the existence of second-order preferences,96 the value
of overcoming weakness of the will, the possibility that private ends have
been distorted by unjust social institutions, and the importance of increas-
ing available opportunities and information. The republican commitment
to political freedom is a generalization of these ideas.98 Although alert to
possible malfunctions in the governmental process, republicans envision
that process as a forum in which alternative perspectives and additional
information are brought to bear, problems are occasionally revealed to be
systemic rather than individual,99 second-order preferences may be vindi-
92. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS, bk. XX, ch. ii (spec. ed. 1984) (Dublin 1751) ("We
see that in countries where the people are actuated only by the spirit of commerce, they make a traffic
of all the humane, all the moral virtues; the most trifling things, those which humanity would de-
mand, are there done, or there given, only for money.").
93. See THE FEDERALIST No. 12 (A. Hamilton); T. PAINE, Rights of Man, in 7 LIFE OF
THOMAS PAINE 6-7 (1792) ("I have been an advocate for commerce, since I am a friend to its effects.
It is a pacific system, operating to unite mankind by rendering nations, as well as individuals, useful
to each other."). See generally A. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS (1973) (discuss-
ing softening effects of commerce).
94. See Goodin, supra note 14, at 93-96 (discussing role of deliberation as a constraint on racist
preferences); supra note 41 (Madison's view).
95. For recent discussion, see J. ELSTER, supra note 16, at 15-26; R. LINDLEY, AUTONOMY
63-70 (1980); R. YOUNG, PERSONAL AUTONOMY: BEYOND NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE LIBERTY
49-62 (1986).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25; Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of
a Preference, 68 J. PHIL. 5 (1971).
97. See generally Elster, Weakness of the Will and the Free Rider Problem, 1 ECON. & PHIL.
264 (1985).
98. Cf. D. HELD, supra note 9, at 270-73 (discussing centrality of autonomy to seemingly diverse
conceptions of democracy).
99. See H. PITKIN, supra note 11, at 347-49.
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cated, and collective action problems and weakness of the will may be
overcome. As we will see, these ideas have powerfully influenced the lib-
eral tradition as well. 00
C. American Constitutionalism
There can be little doubt that elements of both pluralist and republican
thought played a role during the period of the constitutional framing.
John Adams, for example, was at times quite skeptical about the idea that
anything other than self-interest could be the basis for political behav-
ior.101 Noah Webster wrote that "the system of the great Montesquieu"
might be improved by removing the word "virtue" whenever it appears in
The Spirit of Laws and replacing it with "property or lands in fee sim-
ple."102 Patrick Henry said that the "real rock of political salvation is self-
love, perpetuated from age to age in every human breast, and manifested
in every action .... When we consult the common good, we consult our
own."
103
More important, much of Madison's own work, most notably Federal-
ist No. 10, reflects skepticism about important elements of classical repub-
lican thought. Thus Madison believed that a small republic would be torn
by factional warfare, endangering both private rights and the public
good.10 Hamilton expressed similar views.1 5 Indeed, central features of
the framers' thought consisted of fears about the consequences of decen-
tralization and widespread citizen participation, 0" lack of enthusiasm for
material equality,107 belief in the social and economic advantages of a
commercial republic, and a thoroughly modern recognition that self-inter-
est is often the mainspring of political behavior. In such ideas one can find
a rejection of central features of traditional republicanism.
At the same time, there can be little doubt that elements of republican
thought played an important role in the framing period. 0 For example,
100. See infra text accompanying notes 154-60.
101. See J. ADAMS, Defence of the Constitution of Government of the United States, in 6 WORKS
OF JOHN ADAMS 130-31, 206-08 (C.F. Adams ed. 1851).
102. See Webster, An Examination into the Leading Principles of the Federal Constitution, in
PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTrItrrION OF THE UNITED STATES 59 (P. Ford ed. 1888). But see Letter
of Richard Henry Lee to Henry Laurens, in 2 LETTERS OF RICHARD HENRY LEE 62-63 (J. Ballagh
ed. 1914) (criticizing "Mandevilles among you who laugh at virtue, and with vain ostentatious display
of words will deduce from vice, public good!").
103. 3 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 164, 232 (1888); see id. at 536-37.
104. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison).
105. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 9, 12 & 71 (A. Hamilton).
106. Note Madison's claim that the distinguishing mark of the American governments was "the
total exclusion of the people in their collective capacity" from governmental processes. THE FEDERAL-
IST No. 63, at 387 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (emphasis in original).
107. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison); J.T. MAIN, supra note 72, at 261-63.
108. The account offered in the text is controversial. For general discussions, often from compet-
ing perspectives, see J.G.A. POCOCK, supra note 3; G. WOOD, supra note 3; Ackerman, supra note 6;
R. DAHL, supra note 5; Diamond, Ethics and Politics: The American Way, in THE MORAL FoUN-
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the framers did not abandon the traditional republican belief in delibera-
tive government and the need for civic virtue. First, and probably fore-
most, the framers stressed that their system was likely to attract and pro-
duce representatives who would have the virtue associated with republican
citizens. Above all, Madison's conception of representation incorporated
important features of traditional republican thought. Thus The Federalist
No. 10 emphasized the capacity of a large republic to obtain public-spir-
ited representatives, operating above the fray of constituent pressures.
Madison wrote that in a large republic, representation would "refine and
enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen
body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their
country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to
sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations." 0 9
The belief in deliberative representation led to particular enthusiasm
for indirect elections. In describing the electoral process, Madison argued
that state legislatures should choose "those men only who have become the
most distinguished by their abilities and virtue." 10 And Publius expressed
particular enthusiasm for the President, suggesting "a constant
probability" that the presidency would be filled by characters "preeminent
for ability and virtue." ' Significantly, the electoral college was to be a
deliberative body. 2 And in a remarkable series of debates after the
founding, early Congresses rejected a constitutional amendment that
would entitle constituents to "instruct" their representatives about how to
vote. In those debates, Madison and others made it clear that the repre-
sentatives' task called for deliberation, and that task was inconsistent with
a right to instruct.113
DATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 75 (R. Horwitz ed. 1986). Consider also the view that the
"debates of the Philadelphia Convention are notoriously the highest power ever reached by civic hu-
manist theory in practice." Pocock, Cambridge Paradigms and Scottish Philosophers, in WEALTH
AND VIRTUE 239 (I. Hont & M. Ignatieff eds. 1983).
109. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82 (J. Madison) (0. Rossiter ed. 1961). This idea of course
confined deliberative aspirations by limiting the category of political deliberators.
110. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 391 (. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
111. THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 414 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
112. Id. at 412.
113. Consider Sherman's statement: "[Tihe words are calculated to mislead the people, by convey-
ing an idea that they have a right to control the debates of the Legislature. This cannot be admitted to
be just, because it would destroy the object of their meeting. I think, when the people have chosen a
representative, it is his duty to meet others from the different parts of the Union, and consult, and
agree with them to such acts as are for the general benefit of the whole community. If they were to be
guided by instructions, there would be no use in deliberation . I." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 733-45 (J.
Gales ed. 1789).
There was in this debate a struggle between two conceptions of republicanism. The first, repre-
sented by the New England towns, borrowed from the classical tradition and saw local self-determina-
tion as an argument for the right to instruct. The second, based on Madisonian principles, saw the
national government as the locus of republican deliberation, and regarded a local right to instruct as a
serious threat.
All this is consistent with Madison's view that "[I]n our Governments the real power lies in the
majority of the Community, and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from
acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the Government is
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The framers' conception of representation, in short, incorporated the
traditional republican faith in the value of virtue and deliberation in polit-
ics, with an accompanying belief in agreement of a regulative ideal.114
Madisonian republicanism calls for substantial autonomy on the part of
representatives. They are charged not with implementing what their con-
stituents "want," though that is of course relevant; the deliberative task
requires a measure of independence. Thus Madison favored large election
districts and long length of service, in order both to limit factionalism by
separating representatives from constituents and to encourage deliberation
on the general good. Thus it was that the framers had especially high
hopes for the Presidency and the Senate, showed little fear of an insulated
judiciary, and were modest in their expectations for the House of Repre-
sentatives-precisely the reverse of the expectations and fears of the
antifederalists.115
But classical republican thought did not have its exclusive locus in the
Madisonian conception of representation. The act of creating a Constitu-
tion was itself supposed to depend on the capacity of the public as a whole
to behave in the common interest. The decision to write and accept a Con-
stitution serving the long-term interest called for a large degree of republi-
can virtue; and that decision involved the citizenry in general."'
The framers stressed more generally the need for virtue among the citi-
zenry as a whole. Thus in the Virginia Ratifying Convention, Madison
stated: "I go on this great republican principle, that the people will have
virtue and intelligence to select men of virtue and wisdom. Is there no
virtue among us? If there be not, we are in a wretched situation. No
theoretical checks, no form of government, can render us secure. To sup-
pose that any form of government will secure liberty or happiness without
the mere instrument of the major number of the constituents." Madison to Jefferson, Oct. 17, 1788, in
11 J. MADISON, PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 298 (R. Rutkind & C. Hobson eds. 1977).
114. See Meyers, Beyond the Sum of the Interests, in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF
THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON xxiv-xxxiii (M. Meyers rev. ed. 1981) [hereinafter
THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER]. Jefferson said in a similar vein that with respect to the Senate, "I had
two things in view: to get the wisest men chosen, and to make them perfectly independent when
chosen." I PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 503 (J. Boyd ed. 1950). For a recent discussion, see
Thompson, Representatives in the Welfare State, in DEMOCRACY AND THE WELFARE STATE (A.
Gutman ed. 1988).
115. See R. LERNER, THE THINKING REVOLUTIONARY 122-28 (1987). Note that Madison de-
scribed the Senate as the "great anchor of the government." Madison to Jefferson, Oct. 24, 1787. This
institutional understanding was closely allied with a controversial substantive position: the desire to
protect against certain forms of redistribution of wealth. In the framers' thought, the belief in deliber-
ation, the fear of factionalism, and the protection of existing property rights were tightly connected.
See Madison, Property and Suffrage: Second Thoughts on the Constitutional Convention, in THE
MIND OF THE FOUNDER, supra note 114, at 501. But the alliance is only contingent. In the New
Deal period, for example, the belief in deliberative representation was associated with an altogether
different substantive understanding. See Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 421 (1987) (discussing New Deal belief in deliberation and novel institutional and substan-
tive theories).
116. The point is emphasized, perhaps too strongly, in Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discover-
ing the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984). It would of course be a mistake to overemphasize the
democratic character of the ratification process, which excluded large categories of the citizenry.
1560 [Vol. 97: 1539
Beyond the Revival
any virtue in the people, is a chimerical idea. If there be sufficient virtue
and intelligence in the community, it will be exercised in the selection of
these men; so that we do not depend on their virtue, or put confidence in
our rulers, but in the people who are to choose them."' Even more strik-
ingly, Madison suggested that republican government calls for more virtue
from the citizenry than "any other form.""" In this sense, the very belief
in virtuous representation resulted from some optimism about the
citizenry.
What emerged is in several respects a hybrid. A number of elements
competed in the theory of politics embodied in the American Constitution.
First, the framers' conception of human nature synthesized elements of
classical republicanism with its emerging interest-group competitor. Thus
Publius wrote that "[tihe supposition of universal venality in human na-
ture is little less an error in political reasoning than the supposition of
universal rectitude."" 9 In the same vein, he claimed that "[a]s there is a
degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of circum-
spection and distrust, so there are other qualities in human nature, which
justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence."' 20 In these respects,
purely pluralist readings of the founding period12' are badly off the mark.
Second, the federalist conception of representation steered a middle
course between Burkean and pluralist approaches. A critical feature of the
thought of the founding period is a belief in the deliberative capacities of
representatives and the need to insulate public officials from constituent
pressures in order to promote the performance of their deliberative tasks.
At the same time, however, the framers were well aware of the need to
ensure a measure of accountability to the public, and thus they built into
the system mechanisms of electoral control.' 22
Third, the base institutions of the Constitution-checks and balances,
bicameralism, federalism, and legal rights-continued the fusion of repub-
lican and pluralist elements. The system of checks and balances permitted
"ambition ... to counteract ambition"; 23 thus The Federalist No. 51
suggests that self-interest will be channeled in such a way as to protect the
citizenry as a whole. Checks and balances would also increase the likeli-
hood of deliberation in government. The requirement of agreement among
117. 3 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 536-37 (1888).
118. See THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 346 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
119. THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 458 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter 1961).
120. THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 346 (J. Madison) (C.-Rossiter 1961).
121. See, e.g., R. DAHL, supra note 5, at 4-32 (1956); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 2-3 (1971).
122. See THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 351 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (the "elective
mode of obtaining rulers is the characteristic policy of republican government").
123. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); see also Amar, Of
Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987).
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the three branches 24 would operate as a check on factionalism and self-
interested representation, on instability, and on the risk that government
would seek a particular course without having fully considered the
consequences.
Similarly, the federal system was designed to ensure that "[t]he differ-
ent governments will control each other."'12 5 Their mutual jealousy would
operate to protect the citizenry against government invasions. At the same
time, the federal system would guarantee an arena for citizen self-determi-
nation and promote diversity and responsiveness. The considerable role
for the states provided a locus in which to satisfy the traditional republi-
can belief in small republics. To be sure, much of federalist thought was
based on a rejection of the traditional republican belief in local democra-
cies; but the Constitution that emerged furnished a secure place for self-
determination through the federal system, supplementing and comple-
menting national institutions.
Moreover, the systems of checks and balances, bicameralism, and feder-
alism responded to the central republican understanding that disagree-
ment can be a creative force.' National institutions were set up so as to
ensure a measure of competition and dialogue; the federal system would
produce both experimentation and mutual controls. In all of these ways,
the constitutional framework created a kind of deliberative democracy, in-
cluding Madisonian representation at the national level, safeguards
against factionalism and self-interested representation, and opportunities
for local self-determination through the federal system.'1 7
The rights created by the Constitution share similar ambiguities. Many
of the original constitutional rights provide spheres of private autonomy to
be insulated from government interference; such rights can be justified in
republican fashion, but some of them are more easily understood as an
outgrowth of Lockean ideas. Other rights can be read as straightforwardly
republican in inspiration. The right to a jury trial is a good example; 2 s
124. See Sunstein, supra note 115, at 434-37.
125. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
126. See THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 426-27 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("differences
of opinion ...promote deliberation"); 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
547-58 (1833) (emphasizing ways in which bicameralism promotes deliberation and diminishes fac-
tionalism); J. WILSON, Lectures on Law, in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 290-92, 414-15 (R.
McCloskey ed. 1967) (emphasizing how bicameralism improves deliberation and multiplies points of
access to government); cf Michelman, supra note 6 (emphasizing dialogue and plurality as republi-
can commitments).
127. See Bessette, Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Republican Government,
in How DEMOCRATIC IS THE CONSTITUTION? 102 (R. Goldwin & W. Schambra eds. 1980). Con-
troversial understandings of private property were of course a part of this system. See Hofstadter, The
Founding Fathers: An Age of Realism, in THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUB-
uc (R. Horwitz ed. 1986). But it would be fully possible to accept the basic institutional understand-
ings of the original regime while accommodating a belief that redistribution of property was desirable
in a wide range of settings. Indeed, the New Deal did some of this. See Sunstein, supra note 115.
128. The civic tradition, placing a premium on an educated citizenry, valued the jury as a means
of inculcating virtue and promoting participation.
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the right to protection against takings of private property can be under-
stood in both pluralist and republican terms."29 The right to assembly
falls in this category as well. 30
In a number of respects, then, the American constitutional tradition was
influenced at its inception by features of republican thought. But it is not
immediately clear why this fact should matter to contemporary constitu-
tional controversies. Questions about the future of American constitution-
alism might be approached straightforwardly as issues of political theory.
The emphasis on republican and pluralist elements in the founding period
would, under this view, be treated as a species of ancestor worship, carry-
ing with it many of the risks of reliance on the framers' intent to solve
constitutional problems.131 Use of Madison might be justified if Madison's
thought turns out to be helpful; but his status as a constitutional founder
would be beside the point. Madison's views would, in this understanding,
carry no more weight than those of, say, Hegel.
But the importance of Madison for current constitutional controversy
does not depend solely on the quality of Madison's thought. The fact that
the American constitutional regime at its outset owed a great deal to re-
publican thought is an important corrective to approaches that purport to
speak for the American constitutional tradition, but proceed from pluralist
premises... or invoke prepolitical rights."3 Decisions about the nature
and direction of a constitutional democracy cannot be made in the abstract
and acontextually; they must appeal to reasons. Interpretation of the
meaning of the relevant tradition is always an important method of social
criticism;' 34 an understanding of inherited beliefs is an inevitable part of
the project of constitutionalism. The future of American public law de-
pends in significant part on the way that its tradition is understood-a
theme highly congenial to republicanism. And the republican elements of
the framers' thought deserve credit for helping to launch many reforms
that were in retrospect highly desirable.
To say this is not to insist that American public law would have to
adhere to republican thought if republicanism were without contemporary
relevance or appeal. Other aspects of the thought of the founding pe-
riod-its incorporation of Calvinism, for example, and of slavery and ra-
cism' 35-should not be revived even if historians were able to show the
129. See supra notes 61-62 (discussing place of property within republican tradition).
130. See A. Amar, The Bill of Rights: One View of the Cathedral (unpublished draft 1988).
131. See, e.g., Brest, The Mistaken Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204
(1981).
132. See, e.g., R. DAHL, supra note 5, at 4-32; Bork, supra note 121, at 2-3.
133. See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, supra note 31, at 3-18.
134. See A. MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 349-69 (1988) (discussing
ways in which moral reasoning takes place within traditions); Amar, supra note 123, at 1426 n.9
(discussing notion of a "usable past"); M. WALZER, supra note 47.
135. See D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987); A. NORTON, ALTERNATIVE AMERICAS
(1987).
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tenacity of those commitments during and after the framing period. But
the presence of a historical pedigree, one that has accomplished consider-
able good, adds force to the case for a republican revival.
II. THE VARIETY OF REPUBLICAN APPROACHES
A. A Catalogue
I have presented a set of commitments with which republicanism is
often associated. But republican thought has had numerous manifesta-
tions, and there are large divergences among them. In its most classical
versions, republican thought drew a sharp distinction between public and
private interests, and saw in public life an opportunity to abandon or
subordinate private interests in order to promote the public good. Such
understandings draw the most rigid of distinctions between private inter-
ests and public good;"3 6 prepolitical differences are an inadmissible basis
for resolution of political controversy. Understandings of this kind depend
on an expectation that citizens should entirely abandon their private iden-
tities when they come to politics. This expectation," built on an under-
standable desire to ensure against the distortion of politics by interest, is of
course unrealistic. But the difficulty goes deeper. The notion that, for ex-
ample, disadvantaged groups must put their interests to one side in the
political process hardly seems likely to lead to just outcomes. Universalism
ought not to be understood as a desire to obliterate social differences in
politics. Deliberation is undermined, not promoted, by an expectation that
differently situated individuals and groups will say the same thing.
In other forms, republican thought is militaristic and heroic, associating
political behavior with warfare, and valuing in politics the characteristics
prized during times of battle.13 7 Political life is in this formulation ap-
proved as a means of escaping the routine of ordinary life and obtaining a
species of immortality. 3 Here one can see the close association, both met-
aphorical and literal, between republican thought and militarism, and at
several levels. It is in times of war that republican virtue, understood in
this fashion, is most powerfully displayed; it is war that tends to unite the
citizenry in dedication to the public good; and it is war that might serve as
the model, even in times of peace, for the subordination of private interests
to the general good. The use of metaphors of that sort, as a device for
136. See e.g., H. ARENDT, supra note 37, at 250-55; J.G.A. PoCOCK, supra note 3, at 67-71,
199-211, 431-32.
137. See H. ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDrION (1963); H. PrrKiN, supra note 1 (discussing
Machiavelli); J.G.A. POCOCK, supra note 3, at 201; Pocock, Ideological Context, supra note 68, at
18-19 ("[tlhe rigorous equation of arms-bearing with civic capacity is one of Machiavelli's most en-
during legacies to later political thinkers"); Pocock, Argument and Character, supra note 61, at
54-55.
138. Pocock, Argument and Character, supra note 61, at 54.
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rallying and unifying the citizenry, is familiar in modern political life.1" 9
But efforts to assimilate politics to war will often lead in undesirable
directions. 140
In addition, classical republicanism was comfortable with firm social
hierarchies, placed a large emphasis on the role of tradition, and was
sometimes built on organic conceptions of the state that found common
interests among members of different social classes. 41 Understandings of
this sort are of course incompatible with modern beliefs in eliminating (at
least some) status hierarchies; indeed, they coexist awkwardly with the
republicans' own commitment to political equality.
Other forms of republicanism are highly rationalistic, even Carte-
sian. 42 Here the emphasis on deliberation is designed to enable citizens to
transcend bodily drives, to eliminate affective ties or empathy, and to en-
sure the dominance of reason, narrowly understood, in politics.1 43 Forms
of republican thought that value militarism and the overcoming of physi-
cal drives, and that devalue the private sphere as part of "nature," are
often accompanied by misogyny.1 44 The exclusion of women from politics,
a familiar part of republican regimes, is an outgrowth of ideas of this sort.
But an understanding that attempts to eliminate affective ties, or even an-
ger, from the political process will likely be self-defeating, and in any case
will lead in undesirable directions. Thus other versions of republican
thought are far less Cartesian and also attempt to develop conceptions of
politics unaffected by gender and other unjust hierarchies.145 Some mod-
ern forms of republicanism furnish no sharp split between public and pri-
vate interests, and attempt to channel self-interest in such a way as to
promote the common good.1 41
139. President Johnson's War on Poverty and President Carter's response to the energy crisis are
conspicuous recent examples.
140. There is also an issue of gender here: the military metaphor traditionally operated to exclude
women. See H. PrrxIN, supra note 1, at 4 (suggesting that Machiavelli was "both a republican and
something like a protofascist").
141. See the discussion of Aristotle in J.G.A. POCOCK, supra note 3, at 66-80; see also J. MANS-
BRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY 5 (1982).
142. See H. ARENDT, supra note 137, at 86-110 (discussing the social question); see also Pitkin,
supra note 52, at 334-38 (criticizing Arendt); R. BERNSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL PROFILES (1985)
(same); compare J. HABERMAS, REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIm-Y 273-338 (1985)
(emphasizing possible role of reason in generating social norms) with I. BALBUS, MARXISM AND
DOMINATION (1983) (criticizing Habermas as excessively rationalistic).
143. This view is of course associated with one reading of Kant. See C. TAYLOR, Kant's Theory
of Freedom, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 318 (1985).
144. See supra note 140; H. PrrKIN, supra note 1, at 5 ("From the political ideals of ancient
Athens to their recent revival by Hannah Arendt, republican activism seems to be linked to 'manly'
heroism and military glory, and to disdain for the household, the private, the personal, and the sen-
sual."); G. LLOYD, THE MAN OF REASON (1984); J. ELSHTAIN, PUBLIC MAN, PRIVATE WOMAN
(1981).
145. See B. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY 198-203, 233-44 (1984); H. PrrsuN, supra note 1,
at 300-04.
146. See also Ackerman, supra note 6; Skinner, The Idea of Negative Liberty: Philosophical and
Historical Perspectives, in PHILOSOPHY IN HISTORY 193 (R. Rorty, J.B. Schneewind & Q. Skinner
eds. 1984).
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B. Liberal Republicanism
Much of recent writing on constitutional history has focused on a sup-
posed tension between liberalism and republicanism. 4" The basic claim
here is that before the framing of the Constitution, republican principles
predominated. The framing period reflected a conflict between the two
ideologies, out of which liberalism emerged victorious; after the Constitu-
tion was enacted, the nation entered into a period of liberalism in which
republican principles played at most a subordinate role.""8 There is con-
siderable dispute about the precise extent and timing of the victory of lib-
eralism over republicanism,'4 9 but this basic chronology captures much of
the current historical consensus.
The position has something to be said in its favor. Some forms of liberal
thought are inconsistent with the basic tenets of republicanism. They see
freedom only as protection from the public sphere; limit the role of gov-
ernment to the prevention of force and fraud; regard existing preferences
and entitlements as exogenous to politics; place little premium on political
or economic equality; downplay the role of deliberation and virtue; and
view the protection of individual self-interest, narrowly defined, as the
goal of the state.'8 0 Views of this sort are at the opposite pole of the re-
publicanism found, for example, in Benjamin Rush, and Rush's views
conflict with the species of republicanism outlined here.' The hierarchi-
cal characteristics of classical republicanism are also in severe tension with
liberal thought, which places a premium on individual capacity to break
out of traditional roles.
Moreover, antifederalist thought was united, albeit somewhat loosely,
by fears of commercial development, 152 belief in civic virtue, and desire for
equality and local self-determination. On all of these scores, their federal-
ist opponents were sharp opponents.' There can be no doubt that the
basic program of the federalists was ultimately vindicated.
147. See, e.g., Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional Thought, 29
WM. & MARY L. REV. 57 (1987). But see Kloppenberg, supra note 39 (arguing that framers were
both liberals and republicans).
148. See G. WOOD, supra note 3; see also J. APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL OR-
DER: THE REPUBLICAN VISION OF THE 1790's (1984).
149. See J. DIGGINS, THE LOST SOUL OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1984); J.G.A. POCOCK, supra
note 3, at 333-552; G. WOOD, supra note 3; Kramnick, Republican Revisionism Revisited, 87 AM.
HisT. REv. 629 (1982); Banning, supra note 3.
150. Some of these ideas can be traced to T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (M. Oakeshott ed. 1946). This
presentation of liberalism is, however, offered much more often by critics of liberals than by liberals
themselves. See M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); R. UNGER, KNOWL-
EDGE AND POLITICS (1975).
151. See Rush, A Plan for the Establishment of Public Schools and the Diffusion of Knowledge
in Pennsylvania (Philadelphia 1786), in 1 AMERICAN WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA
1760-1805 (C. Hyneman & D. Lutz eds. 1983).
152. It is important to note, however, that at its inception the belief in commercial development
and private markets was self-consciously an attack on aristocratic rule. See A. HIRSCHMAN, supra
note 93.
153. See J.T. MAIN, supra note 72, at 10-11, 132, 170, 249-81.
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The opposition between liberal and republican thought in the context of
the framing is, however, largely a false one. Only through a caricature of
the tradition154 can liberalism be thought to be the antonym of the species
of republicanism that operated during the constitutional period. The cari-
cature singles out relatively marginal species of liberalism-possessive in-
dividualism or modern neo-Lockeanism-and treats them as representa-
tive and central. But most of the great liberal thinkers did not take
interests as prepolitical. Indeed, they placed a high premium on delibera-
tion and discussion,ES and on the capacity of political dialogue to improve
outcomes and to undermine unjustified disparities in power. It is a simi-
larly large mistake to suggest that liberal thinkers believed that threats lay
only in government intrusions and that there was no right to protection
from private power. 5 Liberal thinkers have been alert to the threats
posed by both public and private power and have sought to design systems
to limit both threats.1 57 It should not be forgotten that the original pur-
pose of the social contract was to redistribute security.15 Certain aspects
of Rawls' A Theory ofJustice 9 speak powerfully for these features of the
liberal tradition, and embody much of the contemporary appeal of repub-
lican thought.16 0
Some elements of the liberal tradition are highly congenial to republi-
can conceptions of politics. In their emphasis on the possibility of forming
public policy through deliberation, on political equality, on citizenship,
154. C. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM (1975); see Si-
mon, The New Republicanism: Generosity of Spirit in Search of Something to Say, 29 WM. & MARY
L. REV 83 (1987); White, The Studied Ambiguity of Horwitz's Legal History, 29 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 101 (1987); cf Herzog, As Many As Six Things Before Breakfast, 75 CAUF. L. REV. 609
(1987) (criticizing various caricatures of liberalism).
155. See, e.g., J. MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1861); J. MILL,
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1848 & photo. reprint 1965); J. Rawls, supra note 17; W.
BAGEHOT, PHYSICS AND POLITICS (J. Barzun ed. 1948) (dealing with "government by discussion");
E. BARKER, REFLECTIONS ON GOVERNMENT 67-68 (1942); J. DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS
PROBLEMS 143--84 (1946); S. HOLMES, supra note 2, at 141-44.
156. This is suggested by many critics of liberalism, including, for example, C. MACKINNON,
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32-45 (1987) and M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
(1987).
157. See J. RAWLS, supra note 17; Holmes, Liberal Guilt: Some Theoretical Reflections on the
Welfare State, in RESPONSIBILITY, RIGHTS AND WELFARE (D. Moon ed. 1988).
158. See Holmes, supra note 157.
159. See J. RAWLS, supra note 17; see also N. ROSENBLUM, supra note 9, at 152-86 (discussing
ability of liberalism to incorporate, among other things, some goals of communitarian critics of
liberalism).
160. The requirements of Rawls' original position, see J. RAWLS, supra note 17, thus overlap
with the basic republican tenets described above. The veil of ignorance ensures that self-interest, as
ordinarily understood, is not the motivating force of political judgment; since political actors represent
everyone, the distorting force of interest is removed. The purpose of the original position is not to
ensure that political actors are disembodied, but to enable them to see from multiple perspectives. See
Okin, supra note 82.
The veil of ignorance also ensures a degree of political equality, and beliefs in universalism and
citizenship lie at the core of Rawls' theory. Consider section 54 of A THEORY OF JUSTICE, where
Rawls discusses majority rule in strikingly Madisonian terms and offers a straightforward rejection of
interest-group pluralism. J. RAWLS, supra, at 356-62.
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and on the salutary effects of publicity, republicanism and liberalism are
as one. All four of the basic republican commitments find a home within
the liberal tradition. In both systems, moreover, a requirement of neutral-
ity or impersonality,""1 meant in a particular way, plays an important
role. The notion of neutrality is easily misunderstood, and criticism of the
notion has become quite fashionable. 62 Such criticisms are justified when
the notion is based on an unarticulated substantive theory that denies its
status as such,16 3 implies unreflective preservation of the existing set of
preferences or the existing distribution of wealth and entitlements, or sug-
gests the possibility of developing an elaborate social theory without mak-
ing value choices.16 But the notion seems more plausible if it is under-
stood more modestly as requiring (a) that certain considerations not be
taken into account and (b) that political actors offer public-regarding jus-
tifications for social outcomes, or for deviations from ordinary norms. The
requirement of abstraction from certain considerations-like religion or
political affiliation-is the most familiar example of the first requirement;
much of constitutional law is a product of the second."65
On this view, republican neutrality calls for the consistent application
of the correct substantive theory, or even the consistent application of the
speaker's own substantive theory. This idea is closely associated with the
republican belief in political equality. The requirement of consistency or
generalization that lies at the heart of notions of neutrality is a prominent
equal protection principle. 6 The degree of constraint imposed by this
requirement is of course a controversial and difficult question; but it
would be a large mistake to abandon the idea altogether, or to attempt to
eliminate its antonym, partiality or bias. If such notions were eliminated,
similar ideas would undoubtedly arise with slightly different verbal for-
mulations. 67 Consider the idea that theories of moral development are
partial because they are based on male models, 168 or that much of the law
of sex discrimination embodies a male referent.6 9
161. See J.G.A. PococK, supra note 3, at 226-27 (the term liberta both "denotes a state of
affairs in which every citizen participates as fully as possible in decision-making, and . . . one in
which laws, not men, are supreme and the individual receives his social benefits from impersonal
public authority and not at the hand of individuals").
162. See, e.g., C. MAcKINNON, supra note 156, at 164-66. See generally Minow, The Supreme
Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10 (1987).
163. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896);
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
164. See Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLuM. L. REV. 873 (1987).
165. See Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984).
166. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111-15 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
167. Cf J. HABERMAS, supra note 58, at 336, 294 (criticizing approaches that stress the inevita-
ble relations between knowledge and power for giving "no account of their own position," and for
becoming "compelled to a relativist self-denial" and an inability to give an "account of the normative
foundations of [their] own rhetoric").
168. C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
169. See, e.g., C. MACKINNON, supra note 156, at 32-45.
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In both liberal and republican systems, moreover, self-interest is an in-
sufficient basis for political outcomes. In both systems, "rights" are not
prepolitical givens, but the products (sometimes given constitutional sta-
tus) of a well-functioning deliberative process. In both systems, social jus-
tice requires one "not to be a disembodied nobody," but instead to attempt
"to think from the point of view of everybody."17 0 The most collectivist
forms of republican thought1 7 ' are of course at odds with the most atomis-
tic versions of liberalism; 172 republican thinkers who endorse traditional
hierarchies reject the liberal emphasis on political and social freedom for
the individual; but in numerous respects republicanism and liberalism are
hardly antonyms. Republican thought, understood in a certain way, is a
prominent aspect of the liberal tradition.
The elaboration and defense of liberal republicanism is a large task
indeed, but it is possible to describe some of the sources of its appeal.
Liberal republicanism is responsive to an understanding of freedom as
including critical distance from and scrutiny of ends. Republican thought
treats this as a plausible conception of both individual and collective free-
dom; it sees political liberty in collective self-determination;' 73 while it
does not regard political participation as the sole good life for human be-
ings, it attempts to provide outlets for citizen control and local self-
determination.
At the same time, liberal republicans are fearful of public power, and
impose numerous constraints on the operation of the public sphere. Both
private rights and institutional arrangements are understood, however, as
the outcome of a well-functioning deliberative process. Liberal republican-
ism is simultaneously responsive to possible abuses of both public and pri-
vate power; it understands that the private sphere is constituted by public
decisions, but treats that unsurprising insight as a reason for preservation
rather than obliteration of constraints on government. Liberal republican-
ism attempts to limit disparities in political influence among various
groups, including blacks and whites and rich and poor. In this respect,
American republicanism must be understood not only in terms of the
framing period, with its occasional strategies of exclusion, but also in
terms of the Civil War amendments and the New Deal, with their more
inclusionary approaches to public life. Endorsing the modern belief in in-
dividual rights, liberal republicanism is able to incorporate powerful and
widely-held conceptions of both freedom and equality. And it is antagonis-
tic to approaches that see politics as a replication of the existing distribu-
170. Okin, supra note 82; ef. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 455
(1985) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("I cannot believe that a rational member of this disadvantaged class
could ever approve of the discriminatory application of the city's ordinance in this case.").
171. See infra notes 184-89.
172. See supra notes 149-50, 154.
173. See H. PrlsuN, supra note 1, at 7, 300-04.
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tion of social power, that take existing preferences for granted or down-
play the deliberative functions of politics, and that deny the possibility of
mediating social disputes in ways that are generally acceptable.
To outline these points, or to suggest that political actors should "think
from the point of view of everybody," is not sharply to limit the category
of permissible approaches, let alone to solve particular problems. A large
task for the future is to be quite concrete about the consequences of repub-
licanism, properly understood, for social theory and legal reform. That
task has three components. The first is to generate the appropriate device,
or standpoint, from which to develop principles of social justice; the sec-
ond is to describe those principles, having carried out the first task; the
third is to describe institutions and rights with which to implement the
relevant principles.
A number of prominent efforts draw on one or more of the principles to
which republicanism is committed. Thus utilitarian understandings, com-
mitted to universalism, attempt self-consciously to take account of every-
one's point of view.""' Other theories, making deliberation and political
equality central, attempt to derive substantive constraints from the ideas of
neutral dialogue175 and undistorted communication.17  Rawls' own ap-
proach of course relies on the original position, attempting to ensure that
those developing principles of justice are not influenced by factors that are
irrelevant from the moral point of view.1 7 7
It would be foolish to attempt in this space to evaluate these various
approaches, which, for all their diversity, overlap in important ways with
liberal republicanism as set out here. From the republican standpoint,
however, some of the difficulties in these approaches are apparent. In
many forms, utilitarian understandings take existing preferences as exoge-
nous variables-an approach entirely foreign to republicanism. 17 8 More-
over, on republican grounds it is unclear that "neutrality" among compet-
ing conceptions of the good life is always desirable 179 even if it were
possible for governmental institutions'8 0 to achieve it. It is also quite
doubtful that the notion of neutrality, at least as understood by some, can
generate powerful substantive constraints on political outcomes.181 Enor-
174. See, e.g., R. HARE, MORAL THINKING: ITS LEVELS, METHOD AND POINT 107-16 (1981).
175. See B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 10-12, 327-48 (1980).
176. Habermas has so suggested in numerous places. See, e.g., J. HABERMAS, supra note 58, at
294-326.
177. See J. RAwLS, supra note 17, at 17-22.
178. See J. ELSTER, supra note 16, at 109-40. It is possible, however, to have forms of utilitari-
anism that do not do this. See, e.g., J. RILEY, LIBERAL UTILITARIANISM (1988).
179. See Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129 (1986).
The "neutrality" endorsed supra notes 160-69 and accompanying text is a much weaker constraint.
180. See West, Liberalism Rediscovered: A Pragmatic Definition of the Liberal Vision, 46 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 673 (1985) (discussing Dewey's liberalism).
181. Fishkin, Can There Be a Neutral Theory of Justice?, 93 ETIcs 348 (1983) (arguing
against use of neutrality as basis of social theory).
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mous work is necessary to unpack the notion of "distortion" in communi-
cation and to explain its role in developing theories of social justice." 2
Standing by itself, the concept depends on a highly ambiguous ideal case.
For republicans, the problem with the original position as a guide to
political institutions or as a political ideal18 is that it is too solitary and
insufficiently dialogic. The task for political actors is to generate institu-
tions that will produce deliberation among those differently situated, not
to mimic the decisions that would be made by the unsituated-a problem
taken up below.
We may therefore suggest that the basic republican commitments will
tend in the direction of guarantees of political deliberation, including the
basic rights of political participation; the republican beliefs in political
equality and citizenship will generate strong antidiscrimination norms; re-
publicanism is likely as well to furnish basic guarantees of security, in the
form of both private property and minimum welfare entitlements; and re-
publican approaches will attempt to promote deliberation among multiple
voices in the political process.
C. Antirepublicanism
In all of its various forms, republican conceptions of politics have been
subject to vigorous criticism. Some observers have suggested that the belief
in deliberative government is romantic and anachronistic-incompatible
with the inevitably self-interested character of modern political life." 4 In
this view, efforts to ensure civic virtue on the part of citizens and repre-
sentatives are simply impractical-a diversion from more promising strat-
egies for reform. A related objection would suggest that deliberation is
purely formal, imposing no substantive constraints on political outcomes;
on this view, any such constraints are the product of something other than
deliberation.
Others stress the dangers of totalitarianism that are built into the tradi-
tional republican belief in the subordination of private interests to the
common good.185 Consider in this regard Benjamin Rush's suggestion that
each citizen
should be taught that he does not belong to himself, but that he is
public property. Let him be taught to love his family, but let him be
182. Lukes, Of Gods and Demons: Habermas and Practical Reason, in HABERMAS: CRITICAL
DEBATES 219, 234-37 (J. Thompson & D. Held eds. 1982) (criticizing Habermas for failing to do
that work).
183. This is not, of course, the way Rawls intended the original position to be understood. Institu-
tions of the sort described below might be necessary in order to generate real-world processes and
outcomes that the original position is designed to produce as an analytical tool.
184. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial
Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. I (discussing self-interested character of legislative process).
185. See Herzog, supra note 2; K. Sullivan, supra note 2.
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taught at the same time that he must forsake and even forget them
when the welfare of his country requires it .... From the observa-
tions that have been made it is plain that I consider it as possible to
convert men into republican machines. This must be done if we ex-
pect them to perform their parts properly in the great machine of the
government of the state.1"'
In the same vein, Rousseau suggested that the "newly-born infant, upon
first opening his eyes, must gaze upon the fatherland, and until his dying
day should behold nothing else."' 187 Such understandings of republicanism
allow and indeed encourage the imposition of a comprehensive view of
social life on the nation as a whole.188 From this point of view, interest-
group pluralism seems quite attractive in its willingness to allow pursuit
of divergent conceptions of the good. Pluralism understood in quite an-
other sense-as respect for diverse social groups, public and private, living
different lives-appears to be an especially desirable alternative.
Some of the most interesting criticisms of republican theories have come
from those who have little sympathy for interest-group pluralism as it is
conventionally understood. The basic point here is that some of the central
notions of republican politics-deliberative politics, universalism, and citi-
zenship-ignore the persistence of differences and oppositions among
groups in society. 89 In a large and diverse nation, there is no common
good to be mediated through discussion; there is no unitary political truth;
there are instead irreducibly opposed perspectives and interests. In this
view, the problem of modern politics is emphatically not that political ac-
tors have been disabled from bringing prepolitical interests to the process.
Above all, social groups-especially the disadvantaged-should not, in
this view, be prevented from invoking their private interests in the politi-
cal process. A central purpose of political discourse is to enable such
groups to bring about reform by doing precisely that. The conception of a
civic public thus depends on a denial of difference and a belief in tran-
scendence of context-unrealistic aspirations that threaten to forestall de-
sirable change. An approach to politics that seeks to remove such issues
from politics, to operate on the basis of a myth of commonness, and to
remove prepolitical interests, leads in unproductive directions. What, in
such a system, will politics be about? 9'
This view stresses the difficulties of basing a modern political system on
beliefs in deliberation, common good, and universalism. A related problem
with republican understandings is that they put a high premium on delib-
186. See Rush, supra note 151, at 684, 687.
187. J. ROUSSEAU, THE GOVERNMENT OF POLAND 21 (W. Kendall trans. 1972).
188. See J. Rawls, The Priorty of the Right (1987) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
189. I draw heavily here on Sullivan, supra note 2, and Herzog, supra note 2. See also Minow,
supra note 162 (discussing problems of differentiating among various social groups).
190. Cf. Pitkin, supra note 52 (arguing against Arendt's conception of politics on this ground).
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eration through public processes and through the state, and undervalue
the need for intermediate organizations, often nominally private, that
serve both as checks on government and as arenas for the cultivation and
expression of republican virtues.' The most powerful statement of this
position can be found in Tocqueville.' 92
Citizenship, understood in republican fashion, does not occur solely
through official organs. Many organizations-including labor unions, reli-
gious associations, women's groups of various sorts, civil rights organiza-
tions, volunteer and charitable groups, and others, sometimes marking
themselves outside of and in opposition to conventional society-serve as
outlets for some of the principal functions of republican systems. These
functions include the achievement of critical scrutiny of existing practices,
the provision of an opportunity for deliberation within collectivities, the
chance to exercise citizenship and to obtain a sense of community, and the
exercise of civic virtue, understood as the pursuit of goals other than self-
interest, narrowly conceived. The problem with at least some forms of
republicanism is that they tend to ignore or devalue groups of this sort.
What is needed, on this view, is a more differentiated approach to the
relationship between citizen and state than that afforded by republican
theories.
Antirepublicans of this sort do not rely on possessive individualism, and
they are at pains to distinguish themselves from pluralists. Many of them
are dissatisfied with the existing distribution of resources and opportuni-
ties. Interest-group deals, under the pluralist conception, are no more at-
tractive to them than to republicans, and for the same reasons; they simply
replicate the existing distribution of social power. But there is considera-
ble overlap between the view of antirepublicans of this sort and that of the
pluralists. In both approaches, interests are seen as largely exogenous and
prepolitical; in both, politics in governmental processes is a matter of self-
interests, and largely of deals; in both, it is normal and legitimate for
political actors to seek goods or opportunities solely on the ground that it
is in their interest to do so; in both, there is reason for considerable suspi-
cion about the state, and in particular about measures that purport to
reflect a unitary public good; in both, spheres of individual and group
autonomy are highly valued; in both, the notion of mediation among con-
flicting conceptions of the good seems fanciful. The republican belief in a
disjunction between prepolitical interests and political behavior is the
principal object of attack as an ideal that is both unrealistic and
undesirable.
These challenges to republican approaches correctly emphasize the im-
191. See N. ROSENBLUM, supra note 9, at 143-47, 155-60.
192. See A. DE TocQuEviLLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 68-70, 189-93, 242-43, 520-24 (.
Mayer ed. 1969).
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portance of private association and the difficulties in some conceptions of
universalism. The task of incorporating into republican theories the need
for intermediate organizations to be insulated from the state is a large and
critical one. But antirepublicanism of this sort carries serious risks as well.
Intermediate organizations serve a variety of important functions, but rec-
ognition of that point does not eliminate the need to describe the appropri-
ate role of the state and national governments. One must, in short, explain
what it is that the government should do, and here the reference to inter-
mediate organizations is inadequate.
This is so for two principal reasons. First, an approach that sees the
locus of republican virtues exclusively in private institutions undervalues
the distinctive capacities of the state. In view of those capacities, political
deliberation and citizenship must occur within public institutions as well.
It should be a familiar point that the government is uniquely able to
undertake a wide range of tasks, including (for example) the elimination
of discrimination, the regulation of broadcasting, and the protection of the
environment. Tasks of that sort cannot be undertaken entirely by private
actors.
Second, multiple threats are posed by private power, including that
wielded by intermediate organizations, which are themselves a source of
oppression.' Government must therefore play a role in limiting the pow-
ers of such organizations 9 " without denying the importance of their con-
tinued existence. A system that allowed intermediate organizations to pro-
ceed without regulation would lead to intolerable results.
The unifying theme of antirepublican arguments is an attack on the
ideals of universalism and impartiality; the relevant arguments stress the
importance of situatedness and perspective, but it is here that the attack is
itself most vulnerable. Properly understood, the principle of universal-
ism' 9 5 does not deny the existence of different perspectives, and it does not
assert that political participants must put their private complaints to one
side when they come to politics. The belief in universalism affirms instead
that some perspectives are better than others, and that that claim can be
vindicated through discussion with those initially skeptical. Republican
theories do not claim that there is a standpoint unsituated in the world;
they do not impose a particular, parochial perspective in the guise of neu-
193. On the latter point, see C. TAYLOR, HEGEL AND MODERN SOCIETY 116-18 (1979); N.
ROSENBLUM, supra note 9, at 155-60.
194. Recent examples include Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481
U.S. 537 (1987) and Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); see also Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). The issue has arisen most frequently in efforts to use norms
prohibiting sex discrimination against all-male organizations, see Rhode, Association and Assimila-
tion, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 106 (1986), and here there is good reason for a governmental role in coun-
tering practices by intermediate associations.
195. The idea is distinct from impartiality. It would be possible to reject impartiality as an un-
realistic aspiration but at the same time to believe in the possibility of mediating different claims about
social norms.
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trality. Instead they require public-regarding justifications offered after
multiple points of view have been consulted and (to the extent possible)
genuinely understood.19 Such an approach is the foundation of contempo-
rary republicanism. It is for this reason that republican conceptions treat
an understanding of the partiality of one's own perspective as a regulative
ideal for politics, and are highly suspicious of approaches that see pre-
political interests as the exclusive determinants of political participation.
The antirepublican critique rejects this approach as unrealistic and
misguided. But the categories to which it refers and the commitments that
it embodies are highly likely to reflect republican understandings. For ex-
ample, spheres of autonomy for individuals and groups must be defended
on some ground; they cannot be justified as prepolitical; and if the defense
is to be persuasive, it will have to incorporate republican notions of delib-
eration and universalism. Indeed, the very conception of a disadvantaged
group-central to some attacks 1 7 on republican notions of universal-
ism-depends on a commitment to an understanding of what disadvantage
amounts to, and a belief that the understanding can be vindicated through
discussion with those initially skeptical. 9 The antirepublican critique,
like many arguments of this sort, "can give no account of the normative
foundations of its own rhetoric." '199 Arguments that reject universalism
tend to disable themselves from supporting their own descriptive and nor-
mative commitments; arguments that reject neutrality eliminate a possible
source of argument that is not only strategically useful, but an accurate
description of what is sometimes at work. 00
Republicans do not insist that political actors must forget their private
concerns, or that differences and disagreement are inadmissible in politics.
A belief in universalism need not be accompanied by a desire to erase
differences. Indeed, republicans see disagreement as a creative and pro-
ductive force, highly congenial to and even an indispensable part of the
basic republican faith in political dialogue.2 0 1 Discussion and deliberation
196. See Okin, supra note 82. Of course this idea, standing by itself, will not resolve particular
problems-a difficulty that also infects attempts to use "empathy" as a tool for solving political or
legal problems.
197. See Young, supra note 2.
198. The attack on universalism, if it is to be successful, will work not only interpersonally, but
also intrapersonally. Deliberation occurs within the self as well as among different people. Theories
that incorporate notions of situated selves so as to criticize universalism and to celcbrate differences in
perspective ultimately threaten to produce solipsism, or highly disaggregated conceptions of the per-
son. Cf D. PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 219-44 (1984) (exploring different conceptions of the
person over time).
Problems of the sort discussed in the text severely complicate efforts to describe and value a per-
spective without claiming its status as truth, understood pragmatically or in some other terms. See J.
HABERMAS, supra note 58, at 294, 336-37.
199. Id. at 294.
200. See supra notes 161-69.
201. See THE FEDERAUasT No. 70, at 427 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (arguing that
"differences of opinion" and "jarring of parties" can "promote deliberation"); H. PrrKIN, supra note
1, at 90 ("A plurality of classes and interests is necessary to the Citizen vision not merely because
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depend for their legitimacy and efficacy on the existence of conflicting
views.202 The basic constitutional institutions of checks and balances and
federalism should be understood at least partly in this light. Modern re-
publicanism is thus not grounded in a belief in homogeneity; on the con-
trary, heterogeneity is necessary if republican systems are to work. As we
shall see, this understanding will call for institutional innovations.20
3
It would be extraordinarily foolish to suggest that disparities in per-
spective and power do not complicate and distort deliberative processes, or
to claim that exhortations to citizens and representatives to consult the
common good are sufficient to bring about desirable results. And it would
be a mistake to suggest that the republican commitments as described here
lead directly to a particular social theory or a particular set of institutional
arrangements. Large questions-having to do with the appropriate con-
ception of rights, institutions, and groups-remain to be resolved. But the
question is one of governing ideals; and here liberal republicanism is su-
perior to its competitors.
III. IMPLICATIONS
Republican thought, thus understood, furnishes the basis for approach-
ing a variety of issues in modern public law in somewhat different ways.
To be sure, one cannot simply "apply" republican ideas as if they pro-
vided self-evident solutions to contemporary legal problems; there will be
room to contest any particular application. But many contemporary con-
troversies look quite different if viewed through the lens of the republican
tradition. Some of these controversies involve public law doctrine in the
courts; most of them call for initiatives from nonjudicial bodies. For the
most part, the discussion of particular areas will be brief and summary,
attempting to suggest how republicans would approach a variety of
problems rather than to examine those problems in detail.
A. Campaign Finance Regulation; Marketplaces and Freedom of
Expression
Consider, for example, the problems raised by modern campaign
finance regulation. Such regulation has often been challenged on the
ground that it is inconsistent with the "marketplace of ideas"-indeed,
that it effects a kind of First Amendment taking from rich speakers in
each has its unique perspective and spirit to contribute to the community, but also because internal
conflict is an essential and healthy phenomenon in its own right."); id. at 82 ("Citizen virtue is not
the product of a uniform solidarity of identification or obedience. Indeed, in the Citizen vision, pre-
cisely plurality, competition, diversity, rather than uniformity, are the source of ...strength." (em-
phasis in original)); id. at 300-04; cf. Michelman, supra note 6.
202. See the discussion of "Machiavelli at his best" in H. PsmsIN, supra note 1, at 285-327. See
also Manin, supra note 83, at 360-61.
203. See infra notes 249-65 (discussing proportional representation).
1576 [Vol. 97: 1539
19881 Beyond the Revival 1577
order to help poorer ones. It was under this rationale that the Supreme
Court invalidated campaign finance regulation in Buckley v. Valeo.2 °4
There the Court said that "the concept that government may restrict the
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative
voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment."20 5 The Court
did not hold that the effort to promote deliberation among political equals
was insufficiently weighty, or inadequately promoted by the legislation at
issue; the Court held, much more sweepingly, that that effort was illegiti-
mate under the First Amendment.
Under a republican approach to the First Amendment, campaign
finance regulation would be treated far more hospitably. At least some
forms of regulation would be seen as plausible efforts to promote rather
than to undermine First Amendment purposes, by counteracting the dis-
tortions brought about by expenditures on political campaigns. A delibera-
tive conception of the First Amendment, incorporating a norm of political
equality,20 8 would lead to a quite different analysis from the marketplace
model, which has significant pluralist overtones. Above all, the Buckley
Court's hostility to redistributive rationales for regulation would dissipate.
To be sure, there are large difficulties in designing a system of cam-
paign finance regulation that achieves its intended purposes and that does
not serve as an incumbent protection measure.2"7 But republican under-
standings would point toward large reforms of the electoral process in an
effort to improve political deliberation and to promote political equality
and citizenship.
For similar reasons, republican ideas offer reasons to reject recent at-
tacks on the fairness doctrine in the broadcast and print media. Such ideas
suggest that efforts to promote access to sources of public deliberation
should be treated quite hospitably; and that the exclusive use of the eco-
nomic market to regulate such access is undesirable. It is for this reason
that on the republican view a principal current threat to a well-function-
ing system of free expression lies, not in government regulation, but in
204. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
205. Id. at 48-49.
206. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA (1946); see also Rawls, Basic Liberties and
Their Priority, in 3 THE TANNER LEcrTUES ON HUMAN VALUES 76 (S. McMurrin ed. 1982).
According to Rawls:
IT]he Court fails to recognize the essential point that the fair-value of the political liberties is
required for a just political procedure, and that to insure their fair-value it is necessary to
prevent those with greater property and wealth, and the greater skills of organization which
accompany them, from controlling the electoral process to their advantage. . . .On this view,
democracy is a kind of regulated rivalry between economic classes and interest groups in which
the outcome should properly depend on the ability and willingness of each to use its financial
resources and skills, admittedly very unequal, to make its desires felt.
Id.
207. See, e.g., PARTIES, INTEREST GROUPS AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS (M. Malbin ed.
1981).
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government "inaction" that allows the political process to be excessively
influenced by disparities in private wealth and private access. 08
B. Federalism and Intermediate Organizations
A critical feature of the learning of the New Deal period-one with
continuing influence on American law-is that the original constitutional
structure of dual sovereignty was a large mistake, allied with anachronis-
tic goals of limited government and inconsistent with the need for continu-
ing national intervention into marketplaces.209 But one of the great
strengths of the original constitutional system was its simultaneous provi-
sion of deliberative representation at the national level and self-determina-
tion at the local level, furnishing a sphere for traditional republican goals.
A central lesson of the republican revival is the need to provide outlets for
self-determination in the public and private spheres. 10 The Tocquevillian
understanding of a variety of groups, some in local government, some in
purely private organizations, furnishes an alternative understanding, far
superior to the New Deal model.
Understandings of this sort lead in a variety of directions. In the area of
labor law, collective bargaining appears superior to uniform national stan-
dards.2 ' "Reconstitutive law"-reforms that allow state and local flexibil-
ity by restructuring markets rather than imposing inflexible national com-
mands-should be viewed hospitably. 12 Proposals to loosen restrictions in
federal grant programs are an example. From the republican point of
view, efforts to promote workplace democracy also hold out considerable
promise."' Interpretations of the establishment clause should recognize
the role of religious organizations in the cultivation of republican vir-
tues;" 4 approaches to the clause that end up disfavoring religion215 under-
value the role of intermediate organizations in a pluralistic society.
208. See also Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988).
209. See G. MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 101-10 (1966); Sun-
stein, supra note 115, at 440-43.
210. See B. BARBER, supra note 145; McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Framers' Design,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1493-1511 (1987); Sunstein, supra note 115, at 504-08.
211. Thus the proposals in Fried, Individual and Collective Rights in Work Relations: Reflec-
tions on the Current State of Labor Law and its Prospects, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1012 (1984), point in
precisely the wrong direction. See P. WEILER, THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW:
REFLECTIONS ON WRONGFUL DISMISSAL WITHIN THE MARKET, THE LAW, AND COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING (temp. ed. Oct. 1987).
212. See R. STEWART, FEDERALISM AND POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE GREAT REPUBLIC
(forthcoming 1989).
213. See R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY (1985); E. GREENBERG, WORK-
PLACE DEMOCRACY (1986); C. GUNN, WORKERS' SELF-MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
(1984).
214. See McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SuP. CT. REV. 1. There is no inconsis-
tency between the desire to remove religious issues from politics, see supra text accompanying note 85,
and the claim that accommodation of religion will be desirable in the interest of neutrality. Measures
that accommodate religion may be necessary in order to avoid disfavoring religion through facially
neutral statutes that exclude religious organizations; accommodation is thus not inconsistent with a
general desire to remove religious controversy from the political agenda.




Courts review statutes for "rationality" under a variety of constitutional
provisions, including the due process, contracts, takings, and equal protec-
tion clauses.216 To some, the idea that statues must be "rational" is incon-
sistent with the nature of the political process, which consists of "deals"
among self-interested actors.21 But the requirement of rationality is best
understood* as a requirement of deliberation by political officials. The
Constitution requires some showing that a burden was imposed, or a ben-
efit denied, for a reason other than the exercise of political power by the
advantaged class. In its requirement of an element of deliberation in polit-
ics, rationality review recalls republican themes, indeed it is closely associ-
ated with Madisonian theories of representation."' Whether or not con-
stitutional courts should enforce the rationality norm more vigorously,21 9
the norm does have constitutional status, and its continuing existence
reveals the tenacity of deliberative conceptions of politics. 20
D. The Lochner Era
The republican tradition also furnishes a different angle from which to
understand the lesson of the Lochner period. In that period, the Supreme
Court invalidated a wide range of regulatory measures, frequently by in-
voking libertarian conceptions of private rights. The Lochner period is
frequently understood as a lesson in institutional role, revealing the risks
of an aggressive judicial function in overseeing the political process.221 But
a different understanding would stress issues of substance as well as of
institutional competence.
Such an understanding would emphasize the extent to which the Loch-
ner Court posited the existence of a natural and prepolitical private
sphere, one that served as a brake on legislation. The creation of such a
sphere, based on a theory of natural rights, coexists uneasily with republi-
can conceptions of politics. Republicans do of course believe in rights, un-
derstood as the outcome of a well-functioning deliberative process; hence
republicans enthusiastically endorse the use of constitutionalism as a check
216. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983); Schweicker v. Wilson, 450 U.S.
221 (1981); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Frit , 449 U.S. 166 (1980); Williamson v. Lee
Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
217. See, e.g., Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197 (1976); Posner, supra
note 184, at 27-31.
218. See Sunstein, supra note 6.
219. See id.
220. See Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978) (discussing constitutional norms not enforced by courts).
221. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 63 (arguing that courts should protect rights of process rather
than substance). But see Sunstein, supra note 164 (arguing that lesson of Lochner lies in common law
or staus quo baselines); Horwitz, supra note 7, at 1827-30 (suggesting that Lochner was rooted in
conception of rights as prepolitical).
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on popular majorities. But republicans are skeptical of approaches to
politics and constitutionalism that rely on rights that are said to antedate
political deliberation.
On this view, the problem with the Lochner Court was its reliance on
common law and status quo baselines; the Court was unable to see the
ways in which those baselines were implicated in, indeed a product of
law.222 The heirs of Lochner, understood through a republican lens, are
not cases like Roe v. Wade, 2 3 but instead such decisions as Bowers v.
Hardwick224 and Washington v. Davis.225 Both decisions rely on status
quo baselines and downplay the role of law in creating existing practice.
Thus Hardwick relies on the fact that gays and lesbians have not been
permitted to marry, when marriage is in fact a creature of the legal sys-
tem; thus Washington v. Davis disregards the fact that the existing distri-
bution of benefits and burdens between blacks and whites is a function of
the legal system, and not exogenous to it. On the republican view, Loch-
ner, Hardwick, and Washington v. Davis share the same defect: they ig-
nore the constitutive functions of law and the ways in which existing
practices are dependent on past and present choices of the legal system.
E. Disadvantaged Groups
Republican thought might also provide a basis for understanding that
the role of constitutionalism is countering classifications in such areas as
race, sex, sexual orientation, and poverty. A central concern here is that
222. In Lochner itself, the problem was that the Court took as natural and prepolitical a sphere
whose origins lay in the common law itself. On this view, there is a close association between Lochner
and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In Plessy, the Court said that the plaintiff's argument
assumes that social prejudices may be overcome by legislation, and that equal rights cannot be
secured to the negro except by an enforced commingling of the two races. We cannot accept
this proposition. If the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the
result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other's merits and a voluntary con-
sent of individuals. . . . Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish dis-
tinctions based upon physical differences ....
Id. at 551. Arguments of this sort would be at least coherent in the context of a forced integration law;
they are plausible in the setting of Plessy only if the segregative status quo is treated as prelegal. Both
Plessy and Lochner acted as if the law is facilitative rather than constitutive or-to put the point
slightly differently-as if there is perfect transparency between individual will and legal constraints,
and the latter has no impact on the former-a belief that infects much of current law, and that would
be impossible to sustain under republican premises. See infra notes 224-25.
223. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
224. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). The central point here is that the Court decided the case by noting that
it did not involve marriage. But marriage is hardly prepolitical or prelegal; it is the state that decides
who may marry whom. The fact that gays and lesbians may not marry should not, on the republican
view, be taken as a prepolitical barrier to the plaintiff's claim, but instead as part of a range of data
that support an equal protection challenge to measures discriminating on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion. See Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between
Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CH. L. REv. 1161 (1988).
225. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). To criticize the Court's reason on this ground is not to deny the diffi-
culties in developing a workable alternative to an "intent" test.
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the values supporting such classifications are the product of social power;
they must therefore be subject to scrutiny and review.226
In this view, judicial decisions that take a skeptical approach to such
classifications are consistent with the rejection of the Lochner decision, not
with Lochner itself. Republican premises might eventually serve as the
foundation of a theory of social subordination to undergird constitutional
hostility to discrimination against various social groups. The republican
beliefs in political equality and deliberation would function as the defining
notions. The argument here would have to be quite elaborate, but some of
its foundations can be found in current law. 227
There is an irony here. Republican thought has traditionally been al-
lied with exclusionary practices. It is thus odd to invoke republicanism as
a basis for rejecting those same practices. But the premises of republican
thought furnish an aspiration that turns out to provide the basis for criti-
cism of republican traditions. There is nothing especially unusual in this
phenomenon. Frequently cultural commitments are used to revise cultural
practices; indeed those who attempt to revise existing practice inevitably
draw on traditional commitments. 228 The use of republican aspiration to
counteract republican practice is simply an illustration of this general
proposition.
F. Statutory Construction
In recent years, there has been something of a revival of interest in
theories of statutory construction. It should not be controversial to suggest
that approaches to construction are informed by theories of the political
process. Thus it is suggested that courts should understand statutes as
"deals" among self-interested actors and enforce them as such.229 Sugges-
tions of this sort of course are an outgrowth of interest-group pluralism. 230
The idea that the role of the court is solely to implement congressional
purposes in the particular case is also congenial to pluralist understand-
ings. On the republican view, by contrast, one of the tasks of statutory
construction is to promote actual deliberation in the lawmaking process
and to interpret statutes, within the appropriate confines of the judicial
role, so as to minimize the pathologies of pluralism.231
226. This point has been emphasized above all in the gender cases. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
227. See Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 107 (1976).
228. See P. RICOEUR, LECTURES ON IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA (1987); M. WALZER, INTERPRE-
TATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM (1987).
229. See, e.g., Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the
Economic System, 98 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1984); Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
533 (1983).
230. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, supra note 229, at 553, is an obvious example; it also in-
yokes a Lochner-like presumption in favor of private ordering as a tool of construction.
231. See, e.g., Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpreta-
tion: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223 (1986).
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The basic defense of canons of statutory construction is that they are
literally unavoidable. In hard cases, statutory construction is impossible in
the absence of understandings about the background against which Con-
gress legislates. Moreover, it is possible to understand and defend some
canons of statutory construction as a straightforward outgrowth of repub-
lican conceptions of politics. Many such canons appear alert to possible
malfunctions in the legislative process, and attempt to use interpretation to
guard against or limit those malfunctions.232 In these canons, or "clear
statement" principles, one can find the foundations of a republican ap-
proach to statutory construction, an approach that repudiates the idea that
the only role of the courts is to ascertain legislative intent in the particular
case.
Consider, for example, the idea that appropriations measures should
not readily be thought to amend substantive statutes.23 3 Such a rule might
be defended on the ground that the appropriations process is compara-
tively likely to be dominated by well-organized private groups, that it
lacks visibility, and that the outcomes of that process should be narrowly
construed. One might on similar lines defend the notion that federal stat-
utes should not easily be thought to preempt state law. 234 The central
ideas here are that from the founding period, the federal system has fur-
nished an opportunity for state and local self-determination, and that the
national government should not be taken to have interfered with that goal
unless Congress deliberated on the express point. Finally, courts some-
times suggest that statutes will be understood as an integrated whole; 235
one part of a statute will not lightly be taken to undermine the general
statutory structure. This approach to statutes is controversial to those who
believe that statutes tend to be unprincipled trade-offs among private
groups. But the idea becomes more understandable if it is understood as
an effort to ensure that statutes are not undermined by "deals" that serve
as largely invisible qualifications of basic statutory purposes.
These approaches to statutory construction might be defended straight-
232. Some canons of construction attempt to discern the intent of the legislature; others, by con-
trast, operate as a kind of tie-breaker when legislative intent is unclear, and frequently invoke proce-
dural or substantive goals that are sometimes constitutionally inspired. The notions that statutes
should be construed so as to promote state autonomy, see Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halder-
man, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), or to avoid harming Indian tribes, see Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S.
759 (1985), are examples of substantive canons; the claims that deference should be given to agency
interpretations of statutes, see Chevron USA Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984), or that
courts should not lightly find that appropriations statutes amend substantive statutes, see TVA v. Hill,
437 U.S. 153 (1978), are examples of process-oriented statutes. For general and more detailed discus-
sion of these devices, see Sunstein, Statutes and the Regulatory State (1988) (unpublished manu-
script); Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Construction (1987) (unpublished manuscript on file
with author).
233. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); see also Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies
Through Limitation Riders, 1987 DUKE L.J. 456.
234. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157-58 (1978).
235. See Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713-15 (1975) (discussing intersectional harmony).
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forwardly on republican grounds. The narrow construction of appropria-
tions statutes is designed to restrict the effect of measures likely to re-
present interest-group deals; protection of state and local autonomy recalls
the republican belief in local self-determination; in interpreting statutes as
integrated wholes, courts minimize the pathologies of pluralism.
In light of massive changes in the nature of the national government
since the founding, however, it would be surprising if existing canons of
construction were sufficient. And it is possible to outline a series of canons
of construction that are designed to promote republican goals in a differ-
ent institutional environment. All of these canons, to be noted briefly here,
have some basis in current law; all of them have been used by courts in
the interpretive process. The suggestion here is that they ought to be
adopted as self-conscious guides to statutory construction.
1. Proportionality
Some cases suggest a judicial perception that statutes should be con-
strued so that the aggregate social benefits are proportionate to the aggre-
gate social costs.28 This principle, implicit in some of the recent cases,2""
recognizes the risk that well-organized groups might be able to obtain
legislation that would likely not be the outcome of a well-functioning
Madisonian process. On this view, moreover, regulatory statutes should
ordinarily be understood to contain de minimis exceptions. Administrators
should generally be authorized to refuse to impose costly regulations for
highly speculative or de minimis gains." 8
236. See Asbestos Information Ass'n v. OSHA, 727 F.2d 415, 423 (5th Cir. 1984).
237. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
238. See Coming Glass Works v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 799 F.2d 1559, 1565 (Fed.
Cir. 1988); Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Center for Auto Safety v. Peck,
751 F.2d 1336, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Monsanto v. Kennedy, 613 F.2d 947 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See
generally Gilhooley, Plain Meaning, Absurd Results and the Legislative Purpose: The Interpreta-
tion of the Delaney Clause, 40 ADMIN. L. REv. 267 (1988); Mumpower, An Analysis of the De
Minimis Strategy for Risk Management, 6 RISK ANALYSIS 437 (1981).
The difficulty with a proportionality principle or a de minimis exception stems from the fact that
there is no uncontroversial metric with which to measure social costs and social benefits. If courts
understand benefits and costs technically-as in the economic formulation-and make the assessment
turn on private willingness to pay, they will be relying on a highly controversial approach, one that is
likely to have been repudiated by the legislature that enacted the program in question. An approach
that measures costs and benefits in terms of private willingness to pay is hardly consistent with repub-
lican tenets; it would be quite odd to invoke republicanism in order to support such an approach.
Many statutes are designed to transform rather than implement preferences, to redistribute resources,
or to reflect the outcome of a deliberative process about relevant public values. Moreover, there may
be symbolic benefits in a statute that protects (for example) endangered species. Noncommodity values
of various sorts are served by regulatory programs, and republican understandings treat those values
quite hospitably. The proportionality principle becomes workable on the assumption that in some
cases, it will be relatively clear that the social benefits are small in comparison to the social costs, and
that in some cases statutes should be construed so as not to permit or require the action at issue. In
order to make the principle operational, it will therefore be necessary to make a typology of statutes in
terms of redistributive, efficiency, and aspirational functions.
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2. Narrow Construction of Procedural Qualifiers
An analogous principle, also implicit in the cases, counsels courts nar-
rowly to construe procedural limitations on substantive rights. Many cases
involve, for example, the question whether to imply a private right of
action to enforce a regulatory statute;23 the appropriate procedures for
adjusting or eliminating a substantive benefit, as in a claimed right to a
hearing before elimination of welfare benefits;240 and the availability of
judicial review to test enforcement or nonenforcement.24 1 Constitutional
questions are of course implicated here. But the constitutional issues are
avoided if courts construe procedural qualifications narrowly in the belief
that the procedures are less likely to be the product of a deliberative pro-
cess than the substance, and from fear that procedural qualifications
might enable well-organized groups to defeat substantive programs.
3. Consistency and Coordination
Courts have also employed clear statement principles of statutory con-
struction so as to help bring about consistency and coordination in the
law.242 Such a role has clear precedent in the context of administrative
law. Courts have, for example, aggressively construed statutes of the
1920's and 1930's so as to require old-line agencies to consider environ-
mental concerns.24 The Bob Jones case 2" might best be understood as an
effort to ensure that the I.R.S. takes account of the widespread social an-
tagonism toward racial discrimination, as part of the general thrust of
"public policy." Some cases limiting agency authority to impose signifi-
cant costs for speculative benefits can be understood in similar terms. 245
Decisions of this sort might be justified on republican grounds, as part of
the integration of statutory systems into a coherent whole that could plau-
sibly be understood as the outcome of deliberative processes.
4. Promoting Accountability
Finally, republicans would urge that principles of statutory construction
be designed to ensure that decisions are made by those who are politically
accountable and highly visible. If the issue is one of allocation of institu-
239. See Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1193,
1206-07, 1289-1316 (1982).
240. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). For a recent example as a matter of
statutory construction, see Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
241. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chancy, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
242. Cf G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 82 (1983) (arguing that
courts should be allowed to treat statutes as precedents to ensure against statutory obsolecence); Es-
kridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479 (1987) (arguing that courts
should interpret statutes so as to allow for changing social conditions).
243. See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
244. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
245. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
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tional authority, courts should construe statutes in such a way as to pro-
mote political accountability. An example is the Supreme Court's decision
in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,24 in which the Court held-as a matter
of due process-that if aliens were to be prevented from serving as federal
employees, the decision must be made by Congress or the President rather
than by the Civil Service Commission. In other cases the Court, and indi-
vidual Justices, have suggested that the Constitution requires that certain
disabilities may not be visited on certain groups unless an accountable
actor has so decided.247 Decisions of this sort might be understood as in-
volving a kind of clear statement principle.
These examples are designed simply to illustrate some of the directions
in which statutory construction might move if republican understandings
were taken seriously.2 48 Aspects of republican approaches account for
some otherwise surprising practices here, and they might spur further de-
velopments as well.
G. Proportional or Group Representation
In recent years, there has been a revival of interest in systems of pro-
portional or group representation. Blacks, women, the handicapped, gays
and lesbians, and other disadvantaged groups have often had little success
in the ordinary electoral process. In particular, the problem of racial block
voting has sometimes made it impossible for blacks to elect anyone in cer-
tain election districts.149 This problem-sometimes described as minority
vote dilution-produces a system in which blacks and other groups have a
much lower percentage of representatives than of the population. 5 ' Be-
246. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
247. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 597-611 (1979) (White, J.,
dissenting); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Powell, J.); see also Gewirtz,
The Courts, Congress, and Executive Policy-making, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoas. 46, 65-83 (1976)
(arguing in favor of clear statement principles to limit executive power).
248. There are other possibilities as well. First, statutes should be construed so as to ensure that
collective action problems will be overcome. See supra notes 25-31 (discussing failure of pluralism to
solve collective action problems); Eskridge, Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice
Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 323-24, 330-34 (1988) (same). Second,
statutes should be construed favorably to traditionally disadvantaged groups. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 62-75 (discussing republican norm of political equality); supra text accompanying notes
13-20 (discussing adverse impact of interest-group pluralism on such groups). Note that this latter
idea has roots in current law. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (implying
private cause of action to redress sex discrimination); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544
(1969) (implying private cause of action under Voting Rights Act). Note also that the canon in favor
of construing statutes favorably to Indian tribes is an explicit example. A more detailed discussion of
statutory construction can be found in Sunstein, supra note 232.
249. See Davidson & Korbel, At Large Elections and Minority-Group Representation: A Reas-
sessment of Historical and Contemporary Evidence, 43 J. POL. 982 (1981); Frickey, Majority Rule,
Minority Rights, and the Right to Vote: Reflections Upon a Reading of Minority Vote Dilution, 3
LAW & INEQUALITY 209 (1985); Note, The Constitutional Imperative of Proportional Representa-
tion, 94 YALE L.J. 163 (1984).
250. See Note, supra note 249, at 163 n.1. For a discussion of group representation of blacks, see
generally S. WELCH & A. KARNIG, BLACK REPRESENTATION AND URBAN PoLIcY (1980); S.
WELCH & T. BLEDSOE, URBAN RETURN AND ris CONSEQUENCES (1987).
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cause proportional representation might be justified on pluralist and re-
publican grounds, and because it holds out such substantial promise and
risk, it will be useful to discuss the problem in some detail here.
There is a solid constitutional pedigree for group representation, not-
withstanding the constant and emphatic rejections of constitutionally-
based arguments for representation of members of racial minority
groups."5' Despite the rigidity of the one person-one vote formula,2 52 with
its majoritarian and individualistic overtones, group representation has al-
ways been an important feature of American constitutionalism. At the
time of the framing, for example, geography was thought to define distinct
communities with distinct interests; representation of the states as such
seemed only natural. 5 ' It would not be difficult to argue that racial and
ethnic groups (among others) are the contemporary analogue to groups
that were defined in geographical terms during the founding period.
Moreover, the basic constitutional institutions of federalism, bicamera-
lism, and checks and balances share some of the appeal of proportional
representation, and owe their origins in part to notions of group represen-
tation.254 These institutions proliferate the points of access to government,
increasing the ability of diverse groups to influence policy, multiplying
perspectives in government, and improving deliberative capacities.2 55 In
this respect, they ensure something in the way of group representation, at
least when compared with unitary systems. Of course both the separation
of powers and bicameralism grow in part out of efforts to promote repre-
sentation of diverse groups; bicameralism allowed representation of the
wealthy and the masses; the notion of separation derived from notions of
mixed government, which was designed to ensure a measure of represen-
tation of groups defined in social and economic terms. 256
Proportional representation might be designed to ensure representation
in the legislature of all those groups that are able to attain more than a
minimal share of the vote. Such a system has variants in Germany, Israel,
Italy, and many other countries.2 57 In another form, the system might be
designed to ensure that members of disadvantaged groups are given the
251. See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); ef. A. THERNSTROM, WHOSE
VOTES COUNT? (1987) (criticizing Voting Rights Act for producing proportional representation).
252. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
253. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 45 & 46 (J. Madison).
254. See W. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (1965) (discussing mixed
government).
255. See supra note 201.
256. See J. ADAMS, Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States, in 4 WORKS
OF JOHN ADAMS 290-91 (C.F. Adams ed. 1851) (emphasizing role of Senate in representing the
"rich, the well-born, and the able" and the House in representing "the mass"); D. HELD, supra note
9, at 55-61. The American system, however, dramatically departed from these origins.
257. See A. LIJPHART, DEMOCRACIES 150-68 (1985). Note, however, that the public choice and
Arrow problems referred to in connection with pluralist systems must also be taken into account here.
See Riker, Electoral Systems and Constitutional Restraints, in CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM:
ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES (A. Lijphart & B. Grofman eds. 1984).
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power to exert influence on political outcomes.25 Rather than exhorting
political participants to seek the common good, advocates of proportional
representation claim that the political process should be structured so as to
encourage the expression and affirmation of diverse perspectives and
interests.
There is a large literature on various voting schemes designed to serve
the end of proportional representation.2 59 But whatever the scheme, the
simple point is this: If interests are irreducibly opposed, the remedy for
political life consists in providing mechanisms for group representation,
not in arguing in favor of pursuit of the common good.
Various risks, however, threaten to undermine systems of proportional
representation. Proportional representation may marginalize rather than
help disadvantaged groups; it may also increase the risk of factionalism
and political paralysis. The risks of marginalization may be greater in a
system in which disadvantaged groups have one representative who speaks
for their interests, rather than many representatives who are at least to
some degree beholden to them.280 The dangers of factionalism and paraly-
sis threaten to undermine the political process quite generally.2"1 A princi-
pal function of proportional representation is to shift the process of coali-
tion building from the electoral process to the representative assembly
itself. In so doing, such systems may impair governmental outcomes. This
conclusion may follow whether one is looking from the standpoint of po-
litically weak groups or the system as a whole.
From the republican point of view, however, the most significant
problems with proportional representation are that it threatens to ratify,
perpetuate, and encourage an understanding of the political process as a
self-interested struggle among "interests" for scarce social resources, that
it may discourage political actors from assuming and understanding the
perspectives of others, and that it downplays the deliberative and trans-
formative features of politics. Indeed, in some incarnations, proportional
representation tends to accept the basic premises of pluralist politics; it
simply reallocates the distribution of power that underlies interest-group
(even racial) struggle. The reallocation of power is in some settings highly
desirable, but the improvement in politics is only partial.
258. See Young, Social Movement Challenges, supra note 2. The Voting Rights Act of 1982 is
based on this idea. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(2) (1982). Here of course there are problems in deciding
which groups to treat as disadvantaged and in determining which people should be permitted to speak
for such groups; ordinary proportional representation eliminates these difficulties.
259. See, e.g., Rokowski, Representation in Political Theory and in Law, 91 ETHICS 395 (1981);
W. LAKEMAN, How DEMOCRACIES VOTE: A STUDY OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS (4th ed. 1974); D.
RAE, THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTORAL LAWS (rev. ed. 1971); F.A. HERMENS, DE-
MOCRACY OR ANARCHY? A STUDY OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION (1972); CHOOSING AN
ELECTORAL SYSTEM: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES (A. Lijphart & B. Grofman eds. 1984).
260. See generally Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Regu-
lation of Politics, 87 COLuM. L. REV. 1325 (1987).
261. On the extent of the risk, see sources cited supra note 259.
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These considerations offer powerful arguments against prominent mod-
ern defenses of proportional representation; they also offer reasons for
skepticism about systems of group representation as a solution to the mul-
tiple problems of modern political life. The skepticism is especially appro-
priate in national institutions, for which Madisonian mechanisms may be
better suited.
Ironically, however, efforts to ensure proportional representation be-
come much more plausible if they are justified on republican grounds.
The basic argument here would be that deliberative processes will be im-
proved, not undermined, if mechanisms are instituted to ensure that mul-
tiple groups, particularly the disadvantaged, have access to the process.26 2
Group representation, precisely by having this effect, would ensure that
diverse views are expressed on an ongoing basis in the representative pro-
cess, where they might otherwise be excluded. In this respect, group rep-
resentation would be a kind of second-best solution for the real-world fail-
ures of Madisonian deliberation. And the purpose of access is not
primarily to allow each group to have its "piece of the action"-though
that is not entirely irrelevant-but instead to ensure that processes of de-
liberation are not distorted by the mistaken appearance of a common set
of interests on the part of all concerned. 6 3 In this incarnation, propor-
tional representation is designed to increase the likelihood that political
outcomes will incorporate some understanding of the perspective of all
those affected.2 4 For this reason proportional representation may be the
functional analogue to the institutions of checks and balances and federal-
ism, recognizing the creative functions of disagreement and multiple per-
262. Cf Michelman, supra note 6, at 76-77 (arguing for "plurality" on courts). Aristotle sup-
plied the basic underpinnings of the argument, suggesting that when diverse groups "all come to-
gether . . . they may surpass-collectively and as a body, although not individually-the quality of
the few best. . . . When there are many who contribute to the process of deliberation, each can bring
his share of goodness and moral prudence; . . . some appreciate one part, some another, and all
together appreciate all." ARmSToTtLE, POLrrICS 123 (E. Barker trans. 1972). See the discussion of
Aristotle in J.G.A. POCOCK, supra note 3, at 72-73 (suggesting Aristotelian effort to work "out the
theory of society in which every conceivable individual and social type had its appropriate role in
decision-making").
Consider also J. RAWLS, supra note 17, at 358-59 (1971) ("In everyday life the exchange of
opinion with others checks our partiality and widens our perspective; we are made to see things from
the standpoint of others and the limits of our vision are brought home to us. . . . The benefits from
discussion lie in the fact that even representative legislators are limited in knowledge and the ability to
reason. No one of them knows everything the others know, or can make all the same inferences that
they can draw in concert. Discussion is a way of combining information and enlarging the range of
arguments.").
263. See Young, Social Movement Challenges, supra note 2 (arguing for group representation on
this ground); Pitkin, supra note 1, at 90 (noting that on the republican view, a "plurality of classes
and interests is necessary" partly because "internal conflict is an essential and healthy phenomenon in
its own right").
264. See Hamilton's discussion in The Federalist No. 70 of the creative role of disagreement in
political deliberation: "The differences of opinion, and the jarrings of parties in [the legislative] de-
partment of the government . . . often promote deliberation and circumspection; and serve to check
the excesses of the majority." THE FEDERALST No. 70, at 426-27 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed.
1961).
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spectives for the governmental process. 65 In this sense there is continuity
between recent proposals for proportional representation and the republi-
can elements of the original constitutional regime.
The formal or functional exclusion of important categories of the citi-
zenry has often been an ingredient in republican systems; contemporary
politics furnishes several illustrations. For this reason, proportional or
group representation may, in some contexts, be a highly desirable reform.
Perhaps surprisingly, it is desirable above all from the standpoint of re-
publican premises that its supporters are often at such pains to deny. Dis-
tinctly non-Madisonian institutions may be necessary to achieve the
Madisonian goal of deliberative democracy.
IV. CONCLUSION
Republican conceptions of politics have taken many forms; only some of
them are attractive. I have suggested that the most powerful versions of
republicanism are not antiliberal at all. Instead they borrow from a signif-
icant strand of the liberal tradition, emphasizing political equality, the
need to provide outlets for self-determination by the citizenry, the impossi-
bility of maintaining democracy without a degree of citizen mobilization,
the value of institutional and rights-based constraints on factionalism and
self-interested representation, and the deliberative functions of politics.
Above all, republican theories stress the importance of dialogue and disa-
greement in the governmental process; they are designed to ensure, not
that political actors are disembodied, but that to the extent possible they
look through the eyes of all those affected." 6'
It would be a mistake to suggest that by itself, an approach of this sort
could lead to a particular set of institutional arrangements or a particular
specification of public and private rights. But if understood in this fashion,
republican theories have played a central role in American public law.
The task for modern republicanism is not, however, one of excavation.
Contemporary republicanism is more to be made than found, even if his-
torical commitments can illuminate, in somewhat surprising ways, the na-
ture of American constitutionalism at its inception.
One of the principal tasks for modern constitutional theory is to move
beyond the republican revival by integrating aspects of traditional republi-
can thought with the rise of the modern regulatory state, emerging theo-
ries of social subordination of various groups, and the need for intermedi-
ate organizations, public and private, to satisfy republican goals. I have
suggested that many areas of modern legal controversy are illuminated by
republican understandings, and that some such areas would be pushed in
265. See J. BURNHEIM, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE? (1985); D. HELD, supra note 9, at 286;
Young, Sodal Movement Challenges, supra note 2.
266. See Okin, supra note 82.
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different directions if republican understandings were taken seriously. In
particular, proposals for group or proportional representation hold out
considerable promise as well as risk. The basic idea here is that the
Madisonian ideal-representative processes operating to filter particular
points of view-might in some settings fail to serve its intended purposes;
and distinctly non-Madisonian institutions may be necessary to serve re-
publican goals.
The republican revival is designed, above all, as a response to under-
standings that treat governmental outcomes as a kind of interest-group
deal, and that downplay the deliberative functions of politics and the so-
cial formation of preferences. The basic republican commitments-to po-
litical equality, deliberation, universalism, and citizenship-have played a
prominent role at central points in American constitutionalism. The con-
temporary tasks are to give content to these commitments and to spell out
their implications for modern legal reform. To carry out these tasks, it
will be necessary to go well beyond the republican revival.
